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I. INTRODUCTION

The role of the judiciary in reviewing decisions of administrative
agencies continues to fascinate scholars and to yield productive
scholarship that uses a variety of methodologies. The approaches to this
question range from the development of theories about the proper
relationship between the courts and the executive branch, such as what
level of deference courts should pay to agencies' decisions,' to the use
1. The literature on the subject of the proper relationship between the courts and
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of statistical methods analyzing whether or to what extent the courts
follow the stated rules of review. 2 The field of environmental law has

been a major focus in these debates: For scholars with an empirical bent,
environmental cases provide a set of decisions in which the political
affiliations of the judges may play a statistically significant role in their
voting patterns; 3 more doctrinally- or theoretically-oriented scholars
know that a court's decision can have great impact on the administration
and enforcement of a statute and therefore on environmental quality

generally.4
This Article examines an important subset of environmental law,
administrative agencies is vast. A leading treatise on the subject devotes an entire chapter
to explaining and distinguishing rules of deference in the administrative law context. See 2
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§ 11.1-11.7 (4th ed. 2003). For
representative views from different perspectives on how courts should act in the variety of
factual settings for agency review cases, see HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS (1962) ;John
F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency
Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 998 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath:
JudicialReview of Agency Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988);
Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Agency Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; Mark
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency
Interpretationsof Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REV. 83 (1994); Peter L. Strauss, One HundredFifty Cases
Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources frJudicialReview of Agency
Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal,
101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An EmpiricalStudy of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALEJ. ON REG. 1 (1998); ThomasJ. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation ofChevron, 73 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823 (2006); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C.
Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron
Station: An EmpiricalStudy of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1007 (1990).
3. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 825-26, 830-31 (identifying environmental
law cases as having liberal and conservative outcomes); Revesz, supra note 2, at 1719
(studying D.C. Circuit environmental cases empirically and concluding that "ideology
significantly influences judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit"); see also Paul G. Kent
&.John A. Pendergrass, Has NEPA Become a Dead Issue? PreliminaryResults of a Comprehensive
Study of NEPA Litigation, 5 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH.J. 11 (1986).
4. For example, in the area of air pollution see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007) (rejecting administrative interpretation of the Clean Air Act and requiring
regulation of greenhouse gases); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding
regulation of lead additives in gasoline under the Clean Air Act); Natural Res. Def. Council
v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976) (requiring EPA to establish a National Ambient Air
Quality Standard for airborne lead). In the area of water pollution, see Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (dividing the Court over the issue of what waters are subject to
regulation under the Clean Water Act); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (same); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S.
121 (1985) (unanimously holding that some wetlands are included in the regulatory
jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act).
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namely protection of federal lands under the Wilderness Act. The set of
judicial decisions involving wilderness areas are understudied from a
doctrinal perspective and unexamined empirically.5 That oversight
constitutes a significant gap from many vantage points. Chronologically,
the federal government has legally protected wilderness in several forms
since the 1920s, and Congress embodied and standardized this
protection in the 1964 Wilderness Act,6 thus providing over a
generation's worth of statutory protection that predates what is generally
acknowledged as the beginning of the modem era of statutory protection
for the environment in the 1970s.' Geographically, since the enactment
of the Wilderness Act, the National Wilderness Preservation System
(which consists only of federally-owned lands) has grown from
approximately 9 million acres to well over 109 million acres-a land
area roughly equal to the size of the state of California-and federallyprotected wilderness areas exist in all but six states.9 Politically, every
president since Lyndon Johnson has signed legislation adding acreage to
the National Wilderness Preservation System, which demonstrates the
System's longstanding bipartisan political support.'" The history of
wilderness lands and wilderness laws also demonstrates that political
compromises are sometimes necessary to smooth the way for the system
to grow and to placate legislative opponents; nevertheless, the overall
trend is toward more lands included within a system that enjoys fairly
constant high levels of protection through exclusion of particular uses.
5. Judicial decisions about wilderness designation have received unsystematic review
in the literature. See H. Anthony Ruckel, The Wilderness Act and the Courts, 76 DENV. U. L.
REV. 611 (1999); Matthew J. Ochs, Note, Defining Wilderness: From McCloskey to Legislative,
Administrative andJudicialParadigms,76 DENY. U. L. REv. 659 (1999).
6. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
1131-1136 (Westlaw 2009)).
7. See RICHARDJ. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 67 (2004); Robert
L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Wilderness In Context, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 383,
387-89 (1999).
8. See Wilderness Fast Facts, http://www.wilderness.net (navigate to About
Wilderness, then Fast Facts) (last visited Dec. 23, 2009).
9. Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, and Rhode Island are the
exceptions. Id. There is also one wilderness area in Puerto Rico. See Caribbean National
Forest Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-118, 119 Stat. 2527 (2005) (creating El Toro
Wilderness). There are no wilderness areas in the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, Guam, or American Samoa. See Wilderness Fast Facts, supra note 8 (noting
location of wilderness areas).
10. On March 30, 2009, President Obama joined this list when he signed the
Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, 125 Stat. 991 (2009)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C.). That act added over 2
million additional acres to the National Wilderness Preservation System. See Wilderness
Fast Facts, supra note 8.
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Public opinion polls mirror this federal support. Although the creation of
specific wilderness areas often provokes controversy among those near
the proposed addition to the system, wilderness protection enjoys
widespread national popularity.
Of course, Congress cannot set the daily management policies and
directives for all 109 million acres of wilderness, so it has entrusted that
task to administrative agencies. Those agencies undertake to ensure that
they protect and manage 1' the areas "in such manner as will leave them
unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to
provide for the protection of these areas, the preservation of their
wilderness character, and for the gathering and dissemination of
information regarding their use and enjoyment as wilderness."' 2 In the
course of managing -these areas, the agencies must exercise their
discretion to determine the best policy directives for wilderness in light
of the legislatively prohibited and permitted activities. That mandate
requires them to construe the terms of the Wilderness Act to ensure that
their actions comport with it. Because federal law generally allows
individuals to challenge in court decisions of administrative agencies
that injure them,' 3 discerning the statutory protection of wilderness can
ultimately involve the judiciary in the overall enterprise of wilderness
management. These court challenges take two basic forms. Wilderness
advocates have challenged management decisions that arguably
undermine wilderness values. Also, some individuals who believe that
wilderness designation and protection should not interfere with activities
they favor and that the Wilderness Act would appear to prohibit, have
sought judicial imprimatur for their activities. Being subject to such
judicial second-guessing is a fact of life for administrative agencies,
with respect to decisions affecting wilderness as well as for other policy
areas.
In many basic respects, judicial review of agency decisions
effectuating the Wilderness Act resembles judicial review of other
interpretations within environmental law. However, initial data indicate
a wide gap in the success rate of the agencies before the courts
depending on the type of challenge they face. When agencies defend
decisions that arguably threaten wilderness protection against challenges
by environmental organizations, the agencies win only about 44% of the
time. When agencies defend decisions against challenges that they are
11. See 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (Westlaw 2009) (providing that wilderness "is protected
and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions").
12. Id. § 1131(a).
13. See5 U.S.C. § 702 (Westlaw 2009).
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protecting wilderness too stringently, they prevail in approximately 88%
of their cases. This two-fold difference in success rates depending on the
type of challenge indicates a significant difference in how courts
approach wilderness decisions. One may describe it as a one-way
judicial ratchet in favor of wilderness protection. In other words,
wilderness litigation results in heightened protection of these areas more
often than would be expected from other areas of administrative law. For
those interested in management of wilderness areas, this effect is
significant.
Wilderness protection presents a fruitful area for empirical analysis
of judicial review in the area of environmental law for at least three
additional reasons beyond the context of wilderness protection. First, the
Supreme Court has never decided a case directly interpreting the reach
of, prohibitions in, or exceptions to the Wilderness Act. Second, changes
in presidential administrations have not changed the overall goals and
objectives of administration of the statutory provisions of the Wilderness
Act once areas have been added to the National Wilderness Preservation
System. 4 In other areas of environmental law, changes in presidential
administration bring different environmental stakeholders into position
to influence the direction of federal agency actions. However, every
president since Lyndon Johnson has signed bills protecting additional
areas as wilderness. Third, there has been little change in the statutory
framework. Congress has amended the Wilderness Act itself only
once. 5 Congress has added other areas to the National Wilderness
Preservation System through subsequent acts, but, with limited
exceptions, all those later acts subject the areas included to the
restrictions of the original Wilderness Act. Wilderness law has thus
remained stable over time.
To explore judicial review of wilderness management, this Article
begins in Part II with the history and substance of the Wilderness Act
14. Professor Revesz suggests that changes in presidential administration may not be
reflected in judicial voting patterns in environmental cases. See Richard L. Revesz,
CongressionalInfluence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency
Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100 (2001).
15. That amendment involved fairly narrow changes to the law regarding one
wilderness area in particular. The original Wilderness Act contained a section regarding
the Boundary Waters, the only wilderness area specifically named in the text of the
Wilderness Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (Westlaw 2009), repealed by Act of Oct. 21, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-495, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 1649, 1650 (1978). In 1978, Congress enacted the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act to provide much more specific legislative
direction for that area, and, in the process, repealed the original Section 4(d)(5) and
renumbered the subsections following it. Id. Otherwise, the Wilderness Act as enacted by
Congress in 1964 remains today in its original form.
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itself as interpreted by the agencies and the courts. It will also shed some
light on the intellectual development of wilderness as a concept. Part III
then examines whether the one-way ratchet described above exists, first
exploring in depth relevant case studies as well as providing some
linguistic and jurisprudential analysis of the cases, and then offering
numerical evidence to demonstrate the existence of the phenomenon.
Part IV then offers some explanations for the results in wilderness
management cases. Some of these hypotheses are supported by the
numerical evidence, though further study to help illuminate their
explanatory power is needed.
One caveat deserves strong emphasis. The preservation of
wilderness is a desirable goal for many reasons, from ecological
protection to spiritual renewal. The reader should not construe the
arguments in this Article as an attack on wilderness as a concept or a
case for a particular vision of how wilderness is, could, or should be
administered. Rather, this Article aims primarily to foster discussion of
the phenomenon of judicial review of administrative actions in the
wilderness context. That information can benefit members of many
communities, from those interested in environmental protection
generally and wilderness preservation specifically to those interested in
empirical analysis of the courts.
II. DEFINING WILDERNESS
A subject like wilderness often inspires effusive and creative
writing, which can stem from a desire for freedom or isolation, a feeling
of spiritual connections to nature, and a perceived need to defend wild
lands on ecological grounds.16 One need not, however, go to a federally-

16. Historical treatments of the development of wilderness as a concept in American
intellectual history include RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN

MIND (4th ed. 2001) and PAUL SUTI'ER, DRIVEN WILD: HOW THE FIGHT AGAINST
AUTOMOBILES LAUNCHED THE MODERN WILDERNESS MOVEMENT (2002). See also MAX
OELSCHLAEGER, THE IDEA OF WILDERNESS: FROM PREHISTORY TO THE AGE OF ECOLOGY

(1991). Works that focus in particular on the development of legally protected wilderness
areas before and after the enactment of the Wilderness Act include DENNIS M. ROTH, THE
WILDERNESS MOVEMENT AND THE NATIONAL FORESTS (1988) and DOUG SCOTT, THE
ENDURING WILDERNESS: PROTECTING OUR NATURAL HERITAGE THROUGH THE WILDERNESS

ACT (2004). For treatments of the subject of wilderness within the legal literature, see, e.g.,
Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 OR. L. REV.
288 (1966); John Copeland Nagle, The Spiritual Values of Wilderness, 35 ENVTL. L. 955
(2005); Symposium, Wilderness Act of 1964: Reflections, Applications, and Predictions,76 DENV.
U. L. REV. 331 (1999); Sandra Zellmer, A PreservationParadox:PoliticalPrestidigitationand an
Enduring Resource of Wildness, 34 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2004).
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protected "wilderness area" to have those reactions." Much of the
literature on wilderness within the legal academy focuses on the need for
and desirability of preserved landscapes and on debates over adding
lands to the wilderness system, 18 rather than the more narrow definition
of "wilderness" itself and how the courts have treated those areas
already set aside for protection by Congress. None of these exercises,
from poetic celebration to political advocacy, are empty ones. But the
writers do not concern themselves with the legalistic niceties of defining
wilderness, examining permitted and prohibited activities in wilderness,
or analyzing the judicial role in this process.
For wilderness to exist on the ground rather than just in theory, laws
must also exist to separate wilderness from non-wilderness. This Article
therefore focuses on the technical use of the term "wilderness" as it is
defined in the Wilderness Act and has been interpreted by agencies and
the courts. When Congress enacted the Wilderness Act, it could have
defined the central term "wilderness"- in any number of ways. It could
have, at one extreme, banned all human presence from areas defined as
"wilderness" and attempted to encase these areas in a complete legal
bubble. At another extreme, it could have made the term "wilderness"
completely hortatory, allowing commercial and motorized activities
throughout the areas protected by law. The first of these extremes would
eliminate all human enjoyment of the areas, any chance for solitude,
spiritual renewal, or a sense of oneness with nature, though it might
approximate public desires and expectations.1 9 At the other extreme,
although Congress would have diluted the commonly accepted sense of
"wilderness," it would have made wilderness more accessible to many
more visitors.2" Instead, Congress in 1964 adopted a fairly restricted
17. For example, the Grand Canyon and Yellowstone have inspired much beautiful
writing and art, yet neither of these national parks have the legal status of "wilderness"
under the Wilderness Act. Many of the authors quoted in this section, especially in Part
I.B, use this non-technical definition of "wilderness," and examine not only formal
wilderness areas but also national parks, national forests, or areas owned by states or
private parties--and therefore not subject to the Wilderness Act.
18. See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, Settling the Wilderness, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 1159, 1161-74
(2004) (describing and criticizing litigation settlement in the context of lawsuit over
inventory of and management prescriptions for wilderness study areas in Utah); Zellmer,
supra note 16, at 1050-81 (exploring means of wild land preservation through executive
action).
19. See infra notes 114 and 115 (discussing public polling data).
20. The conflict between preserving pristine nature and providing access, especially
motorized access, is a long-standing one in recreational management of public lands.
Cases involving snowmobiles and off-road vehicles arise frequently. See, e.g., Norton v. S.
Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004), discussed infra note 201 and accompanying
text; see alsoJan G. Laitos & Rachael B. Reiss, Recreation Wars for Our Natural Resources, 34
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definition of "wilderness"--one consisting both of a definition of the
term "wilderness 2 1 and a prohibition of and limitations on activities that
can and cannot take place in areas declared to be "wilderness" 22 -and

Congress has applied that definition in subsequent acts.
The statutory definition of wilderness has remained essentially
untouched in the forty-five years since enactment. Although the 1964
Wilderness Act provides the current and overarching definition of
wilderness, other acts have added the majority of the areas and acreage

to the National Wilderness Preservation System; some of those acts
include important provisions that have become boilerplate in subsequent
wilderness laws. A complete congressional history of wilderness
protection must reference those other acts as well. In addition, four
different agencies manage units of the National Wilderness Preservation
System: the United States Forest Service, the National Park Service, the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM).2 3 Although these agencies possess independent
discretion over their wilderness areas, many of their actions are similar
regardless of the agency undertaking them. Thus, the brief description of
some of the issues they have faced will apply to all four agencies.24 A
description of judicial review of these administrative decisions will then
complete the picture of what, legally, wilderness looks like. This section
will then turn to the intellectual background against which legislators

ENvrL. L. 1091 (2004);Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands,
26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 140 (1999). Even environmentalist stalwarts such as John Muir are
sometimes invoked on both sides of a conflict. Tyler Buswell, When John Muir Might Approve
of Off-Road Vehicles, 27J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 123 (2007). Muir was one of the first
to popularize cruises up the West Coast from San Francisco to Alaska, which he saw as an
opportunity to educate visitors about the beauties of Alaska and build political and
popular support for protecting the lands and waters that made up the scenic vistas. NASH,
supra note 16, at 280-82. Cruise ship tours of Alaska are now big business and pose many
ecological threats. See, e.g., Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722 (9th
Cir. 2001) (invalidating environmental impact statement examining effects of increasing
number of cruise ships permitted in national parks in Alaska).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (c) (Westlaw 2009).
22. Id. § 1133(c), (d).
23. For historical reasons, the Forest Service manages the highest number of
wilderness areas and the Park Service oversees the highest number of acres within
wilderness acres. Although the agencies have somewhat different approaches to wilderness
management, their directives governing wilderness and the activities that may take place
within it are more similar than different. For ease, the four agencies will be referred to
collectively as the "land management agencies."
24. The similarity in wilderness management among the four agencies stems in no
small part from the excellent guidance and training at the Arthur Carhart Wilderness
Training Center, a facility in Missoula, Montana, which all four agencies operate
cooperatively. See SCoTr, supra note 16, at 131-34.
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and policymakers hammered out their definitions of wilderness for
purposes of the Wilderness Act and their decisions about permissible
uses.
A. Defining Wilderness Legally
Many of the statutory and regulatory definitions of wilderness,
particularly through the enumeration of prohibited activities, have
remained in place since the Forest Service adopted the first
administrative protection for wilderness in 1929. This section traces
those developments and shows how changes in regulatory regimes and,
eventually, the statutory scheme, provided additional protection for
those areas.
1. Administrative precursorsto and development of the 1964
Wilderness Act.
To help the reader understand the background that informed the
1964 Wilderness Act, the Act itself,, and successor legislation, a brief
history of administrative attempts to define and protect wilderness is
provided.25 Examination of administrative actions and congressional
responses after 1964 will then highlight some of the boilerplate
provisions that have come to define the legal category of "wilderness."
The regulatory history pre-1964 will aid the reader in two respects. First,
it introduces concepts echoed in the 1964 Wilderness Act scheme,
especially that Act's provisions concerning the review of lands
potentially eligible for inclusion within the system. Second, it offers a
different view of how an agency could manage something legally
defined as "wilderness."
a. Pre-1964 wildernessprotection schemes.
The history of legal protection of wilderness areas in the United
States traces its beginnings to 1924, when Aldo Leopold, a Forest
Service employee, convinced his supervisors to set aside land within the
25. The works of Dennis Roth, Doug Scott, and Paul Sutter each provide an
excellent overview of much of this history from somewhat different perspectives. See ROTH,
supra note 16, at 1-10; SCOTr, supra note 16, at 19-56; SUTrER, supra note 16, at 19-53. All
three scholars rely on the unpublished dissertation ofJames P. Gilligan. James P. Gilligan,
The Development of Policy and Administration of Forest Service Primitive and Wilderness
Areas in the Western United States (1953) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Michigan) (on file with author). Even where I do not cite their works directly, I found
much of the original material cited in this brief summary history through the research in
these works, and credit belongs to them.
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Gila National Forest to become the Gila Wilderness.2 6 The number of
such areas slowly grew.
The various areas protected as proto-wildemess received protection
in 1929 in a regulation referred to as Regulation L-20. 27 L-20 authorized
the creation of "primitive areas" by the Chief of the Forest Service
within which, to the extent of the Department's authority, will be

maintained primitive conditions of environment, transportation,
habitation, and subsistence, with a view to conserving the value of
such areas for purposes of public education, inspiration, and
recreation. Within any areas so designated, (except for permanent
improvements needed in Experimental Forests and Ranges) no
occupancy under the special-use permit shall be allowed, or the
construction of permanent improvements by any public agency be
as authorized by the Chief of the Forest Service or
permitted, except
28
the Secretary.

The administrative directives governing implementation of
Regulation L-20 were not particularly strict or specific. 29 Even at this
early date, however, the Forest Service acknowledged that wilderness
when measured in the Forest
had value beyond immediate gain, even
30
Service's traditional utilitarian calculus.

26. ROTH, supra note 16, at 2; SCOTT, supra note 16, at 29. The establishment of that
area came from the work of Aldo Leopold, but others, including Arthur Carhart, also had
a hand in creating the first proto-wilderness areas. Carhart served as a landscape architect
for the Forest Service and he recommended to his supervisors that an area to which he
had been sent to design vacation cabins, Trappers Lake in Colorado, be preserved as a
wild area instead. NASH, supra note 16, at 185; ROTH, supra note 16, at 2. Carhart made
similar recommendations for parts of the Superior National Forest along the Canadian
border, an area now protected as the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness. NASH,
supra note 16, at 185; ROTH, supra note 16, at 2. The 1964 Wilderness Act automatically
included these areas in the National Wilderness Preservation System.
27. The only copy of Regulation L-20 I have located appears in the Appendix to the
Gilligan dissertation. See Gilligan, supra note 25, at 1-4.
28. Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). According to Gilligan, "[ulnderlined areas [in
this quotation of the regulation] were deleted by a change in the regulation August 7,
1930. The phrase enclosed in parentheses was added at the time of this change." Id.
29. Id. at 1-4.
30. The instructions that the Forest Service distributed to Forest Service Districts
along with Regulation L-20 bear this out and deserve emphasis. The instructions
considered that some uses that would now violate the Wilderness Act-such as commercial
camps and resorts-might be appropriate under Regulation L-20. Nevertheless, the
instructions contained a cautionary and overarching idea:
In reaching conclusions in such matters, however, each Forest Officer should
fully recognize that these fragmentary remains of a once great virgin empire
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In 1939, Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace announced new
regulations that superseded the L-20 regulations. 3' Known as the U
regulations, these rules reclassified areas under the- Forest Service's
jurisdiction most relevant here into four categories: wilderness areas
(Regulation U-i); wild areas (Regulation U-2); recreation areas
(Regulation U-3); and experimental and natural areas (Regulation U4).32 The U regulations systematized the classification of wilderness and
other protected areas by clarifying the authority to change the status of
areas and elevating that decision from district rangers (as it had been
under Regulation L-20) up the chain. Areas classified as "wilderness"
would consist of 100,000 acres or more and would be designated by the
Secretary of Agriculture; areas classified as "wild" would consist of
5,000 to 100,000 acres and would be designated by the Chief of the
Forest Service. 33 Wilderness and wild areas were nevertheless subject to
the same basic restrictions on use.34 By moving protection for both
wilderness and wild areas higher within the Department, the Forest
Service could ensure that these areas received attention directly from
Washington and the more politically accountable people in the
Department.
Both wilderness and wild areas were subject to the same substantive
management restrictions, all of which Congress incorporated, with
additions, into the 1964 Wilderness Act. These restrictions included
bans on roads and motorized transportation, commercial uses,
motorboats, and the landing of aircraft "except where such use has
already become well established or for administrative needs and

have, as such, a real value of great social significance, notwithstanding its
intangibility; a value which, once lost, can never be replaced. To avoid
irreparable loss, it will be well generally to resolve doubts in favor of primitive
simplicity, to encourage or allow only the minimum of change required by
proper protection and management of the National Forests and their resources,
or by the forms of public use and enjoyment which, all factors considered, are
most beneficial and to the public interest.
Id. at 1-2. The Forest Service has had, historically, an interest in promoting "the greatest
amount of good for the greatest amount of people in the long run." See U.S. Forest
Service, About Us, http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2009) (quoting
Gifford Pinchot). The proto-wilderness protection in Regulation L-20 represents a longterm commitment to preserving an area.
31. Occupancy, Use, Etc., of National Forests, 36 C.F.R pt. 251 (1939).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 36 C.F.R. § 251.21 (1939) (wild areas "shall be administered in the same manner
as wilderness areas").
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emergencies." 35 Both areas also had provisions for grandfathered uses
such as stock grazing and development of some water storage projects,
and both allowed the Forest Service to take additional steps as needed
36
for fire protection.
Unlike wilderness and wild areas, experimental areas established
under the U regulations were limited only by regulations prohibiting
occupancy and "construction of permanent improvements" within such
areas "except improvements required in connection with their
experimental use."3 7
The Department of Agriculture amended the most relevant of the U
regulations in 1955, when it provided for areas classified as wilderness
to address certain issues regarding access to private inholdings. First, the
new regulations clarified the rules about roads for ingress and egress
38
into wilderness areas where necessary for access to private lands.
Second, the regulations now authorized motorized access to private
39
lands if in connection with "a statutory right of ingress and egress."
Apart from these modifications, the 1939 U regulations constituted the
basic governing document for Forest Service wilderness and wild areas
until the enactment of the Wilderness Act.4 °
b. The 1964 Wilderness Act.
The 1964 Wilderness Act was the culmination of many years of
lobbying in Congress. Congress defined wilderness in two main ways in
the 1964 Act. The first, the actual statutory definition of wilderness,
contains congressional definitions and aspirations for wilderness. The
second, the uses prohibited and allowed in wilderness, fleshes out those
definitions through concrete rules. This section offers a detailed look at
each of the parts of the definition of wilderness. This exposition will
help explain the details of the subsequent litigation over wilderness
management decisions and why some seemingly minor questions-such
35. Id.; compare 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (Westlaw 2009) (banning permanent roads,
commercial uses, and motorized transportation) and § 1133(d)(1) (allowing agency to
grandfather motorboats and aircraft landings).
36. 36 C.F.R. § 251.20 (1939).
37. Id.
38. 20 Fed. Reg. 8422, 8422-23 (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 251.20(a) (1961)).
Specifically, the new rule appeared to limit the availability of roads to "national forest
lands reserved from the public domain"-as opposed to lands acquired by the Forest
Service-and allowed the forest supervisor to redraw the wilderness boundary to exclude
the road without the need for prior public notice or a public hearing. Id.
39. Id. at 8423 (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 251.20(b) (1961)).
40. See36 C.F.R. §§ 251.20, 251.21 (1961).
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as whether one can bring a bicycle into a wilderness-matter a great
deal in the wilderness context, not just from a theoretical stance, but also

as a matter of statutory interpretation.
Congressional enactments normally begin with ambitious goals
described in grandiose language in the sections containing the
congressional findings and declarations of policy. Subsequent
definitions sections, not surprisingly, read like dictionaries.4 1 The
Wilderness Act is structurally and organizationally different. Section

2(a) declares Congress's reasons for creating wilderness in a provision
that is relatively short.42 Section 2(a) removes the executive branch's
pre-1964 discretion to create wilderness areas; that power is statutorily

reserved exclusively for Congress. By contrast, Section 2(c) of the
Wilderness Act, which defines the term "wilderness," contains some of
the most poetic language that appears anywhere in the United States
Code and certainly the most poetic in a Code section labeled as a
definition. Section 2(c) defines "wilderness" as follows: "A wilderness,
in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate the
landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its

community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a
41. For example, Congress declared in the Clean Water Act a national policy of
eliminating "the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters" by 1985. 33 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(1) (Westlaw 2009). This declaration creates images of the sparkling, pristine
waters throughout the United States. The meanings of the terms of art "discharge of
pollutants" and "navigable waters," however, are much more specific, see id. § 1362(7),
(12), and the United States has not reached the goal enunciated in the policy section of
the statute.
42. Section 2(a) of the Wilderness Act provides in full:
In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by expanding
settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy and modify all areas
within the United States and its possessions, leaving no lands designated for
preservation and protection in their natural condition, it is hereby declared to
be the policy of the Congress to secure for the American people of present and
future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness. For this
purpose there is hereby established a National Wilderness Preservation System to
be composed of federally owned areas designated by Congress as "wilderness
areas", and these shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of the
American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use
and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these
areas, the preservation of their wilderness character, and for the gathering and
dissemination of information regarding their use and enjoyment as wilderness;
and no Federal lands shall be designated as "wilderness areas" except as provided
for in this chapter or by a subsequent Act.
16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (Westlaw 2009).
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visitor who does not remain. '43 Further definition of "wilderness" then
moves from congressional poetry to more typical legislative language:
"Wilderness" is further defined as an area of undeveloped Federal land
retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent
improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so
as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to
have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint
of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding
opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of
recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient
size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired
condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological,44 or other
features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (Westlaw 2009). Howard Zahniser can claim credit for that
language, especially the use of the word "untrammeled," meaning not bound or fettered
(not "untrampled," as many thought it may have been). The word "untrammeled" appears
in Zahniser's original draft of the Wilderness Bill, and it, like many parts of Zahniser's
original draft, survived the years of debate and hearings as the bill wended its way through
Congress on its way to becoming law. See SCOTT, supra note 16, at 47-52; see also Douglas W.
Scott, "Untrammeled," "Wilderness Character," and the Challenges of Wilderness Preservation,WILD
EARTH, Fall/Winter 2001-02, at 72, 74 (distinguishing "untrammeled" from "untrampled"
in wilderness context).
44. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890, 891 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
1131 (c) (Westlaw 2009)). The codification of the Wilderness Act from 1982 until the 2006
version uses the word "underdeveloped" rather than "undeveloped," which was the word
used in the original Wilderness Act. Apparently, the change snuck into the United States
Code in the 1976 version, which rendered the word "undeveloped" as the non-word
"underveloped." Codifiers later corrected that typographical error to "underdeveloped" in
the 1982 version without checking the original text of the Wilderness Act. According to
the act establishing the United States Code, the language of an original act of Congress
governs over the word used in the codified version unless the title of the code has been
enacted into positive law. See Act of June 30, 1926, Pub. L. No. 440, ch. 712, § 2(a), 44-1
Stat. 1. Because Title 16 has not been enacted into positive law, the original text governs.
See Letter from John R. Miller, Law Revision Counsel, to Peter A. Appel (Oct. 3, 2003)
(noting typographical error); Email communication from Peter G. LeFevre, Law Revision
Counsel, to Peter A. Appel (Aug. 20, 2008) (again noting typographical error and
promising it would be corrected in supplement I of 2006 edition) (both on file with
author). The codifiers have corrected the error in Supplement I to the 2006 U.S. Code.
The version of the act using the incorrect language is quoted in only one federal case. See
Reeves v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 652, 658 (2002). Reeves involves mining in a wilderness
study area and is therefore not included in the cases studied numerically below.
Section 2(c) also defines "wilderness" to suggest that a wilderness area should be at
least 5,000 acres, but Congress has discretion to declare to be wilderness federally-owned
lands of any acreage. The smallest wilderness area is the Pelican Island Wilderness in
Florida, which measures six acres. See Wilderness Fast Facts, supra note 8. Pelican Island
has received protection since a 1903 declaration of President Theodore Roosevelt.
http://www.fws.gov/pelicanIsland/history.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2009). Congress has
established no upper boundary for wilderness designations. The largest wilderness area is
the Wrangell-St. Elias Wilderness in Alaska, which contains 9,078,675 acres. See Wilderness
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•Five key features of what makes a geographical region a wilderness
stand out. First, only lands owned by the federal government may be
defined as "wilderness" and protected under the Wilderness Act.45
Second, wilderness is the lack of human habitation or permanent
improvements. Third, although the ideal of wilderness means lands
untrammeled by human hands (or feet), areas that bear remnants of
human impact can qualify as wilderness provided that the areas "appear
to have been primarily affected by the forces of nature," and the human
impact is "substantially" (but not entirely) "unnoticeable."4 6 Fourth, the
suitability of an area for inclusion as wilderness is linked not to its
ecological or environmental value but to its ability to fulfill a particular
type of human use, namely, the provision of solitude and primitive
recreation.4 7 Fifth, and finally, Congress acknowledges that wilderness
areas are not only "preserved" but "managed" as well.48
Fast Facts, supra note 8.
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (Westlaw 2009); see also id. § 1131(a) ("there is hereby
established a National Wilderness Preservation System to be composed of federally owned
areas designated by Congress as 'wilderness areas"' (emphasis added)). There are statelevel wilderness acts that protect lands owned by state governments, and private parties can
also protect their lands as wilderness. Blake M. Propst & Chad P. Dawson, State-Designated
Wilderness in the United States: A National Review, 14 INT'LJ. WILDERNESS 19 (2008); see also
John A. Baden & Pete Geddes, Environmental Entrepreneurs: Keys to Achieving Wilderness
Conservation Goals?, 76 DENY. U. L. REV. 519 (1999) (advocating policies to spur private
conservation of lands as wilderness). Several authors have noted that the private law
governing property has doctrines to thwart individual efforts to protect land as wilderness.
See, e.g., John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519 (1996); see also Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Expanding
TraditionalNotions of Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 283 (2006). Dan Cole has also
argued that governments sometimes do a better job of protecting land in a permanent or
long-term undeveloped state as compared to private owners. DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION
AND PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
150-51 (2002) (discussing habitat for endangered species); see alsoJan G. Laitos & Rachael
B. Gamble, The Problem with Wilderness, 32 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 503, 508-10 (2008)
(explaining how wilderness overuse results from market failure).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (emphasis added). Others have pointed out that the word
"untrammeled" does not mean that the area must be untouched. E.g., SCOTr, supra note
16, at 74-78. Rather, the word "untrammeled" modifies the phrase "the earth and its
community of life," and expresses a view that, once designated as wilderness, the area will
largely be subject to the forces of nature alone and not hindered by human direction. Still,
of course, human activities affect all ecosystems.
47. 16U.S.C. § 1131(c).
48. Id. Howard Zahniser once urged that wilderness protection meant that agencies
should act as "guardians, not gardeners." Howard Zahniser, Guardians Not Gardeners,
LIVING WILDERNESS, Spr./Summ. 1963, at 2. The twin directives to preserve and manage
wilderness suggests that a little gardening might be in order to further the guardianship
purpose. One court relied on the appearance of these two words in Section 2(c) to justify
management activity in a wilderness area, but the decision was reversed by the appellate
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Section 4(c) of the Wilderness Act details activities prohibited in
wilderness areas, implying that the presence of those activities are
inimical to wilderness. That section provides:
Except as specifically provided for in this chapter, and subject to
existing private rights, there shall be no commercial enterprise and no
permanent road within any wilderness area designated by this chapter
and, except as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the
administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter (including
measures required in emergencies involving the health and safety of
persons within the area), there shall be no temporary road, no use of
motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing of
aircraft, no other form of mechanical
transport, and no structure or
49
installation within any such area.
The act thus separates prohibited activities into two categories. The
first category contains activities absolutely prohibited regardless of who
performs them, namely commercial enterprises and permanent roads.
The second category captures activities generally prohibited except
when undertaken to meet the "minimum requirements for the
administration of the area" such as search and rescue activities.
Congress focused heavily on ensuring that wilderness would lack
particular types of transportation by separately enumerating and banning
motor vehicles, motorboats, aircraft, and mechanical transport. These
restrictions and conditions are in addition to the Section 2 definition of
"wilderness" in which Congress provided that there would be no
''permanent improvements or human habitation" within wilderness
areas.

50

Like much legislation, the Wilderness Act contains compromises of
ideals in light of political realities. What Section 4(c) of the Wilderness
Act bans, Section 4(d) allows in some measure. The most important of
the exceptions in Section 4(d) are those created in Sections 4(d)(1) and
court sitting en banc. See Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 924
(9th Cir.), rev'd en banc, 360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 2003), amended, 360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir.
2004).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (Westlaw 2009)
50. Id. § 1131(c). What constitutes a disallowed "permanent improvement" is not
altogether clear. The Mesa Verde Wilderness in Colorado contains several ancient
structures created by the Anasazi people centuries ago. See http://www.wilderness.net/
index.cfm?fuse=NWPS&sec=wildView&WID=352 (last visited Dec. 23, 2009). Congress
made no special provision for these structures when it included the Mesa Verde in the
National Wilderness Preservation System. See Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-567, §
1(h), 90 Stat. 2962, 2963. It is extremely doubtful that Congress would want these
sandstone dwellings removed in the name of wilderness restoration.
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4(d)(5). Section 4(d)(1) contains a panoply of exceptions for
management decisions. First, "the use of aircraft or motorboats, where
these uses have already become established, may be permitted to
continue subject to such restrictions as the Secretary of Agriculture
deems desirable."'" The Secretary is under no obligation to allow these
uses but has the discretion to allow them to continue where already
established. Section 4(d)(1) also contains seemingly boundless authority
for the agencies to fight "fire, insects, and diseases" in their wilderness
areas.

52

Section 4(d)(5) creates an important exception to the use of
wilderness for commercial purposes. 3 It provides that "[c]ommercial
services may be performed within the wilderness areas designated by
this chapter to the extent necessary for activities which are proper for
realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas. 5 4
Thus, guide services or outfitters may conduct their activities with
permission although the land management agencies are under no
obligation to allow it.
In addition to the exceptions in Sections 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(5), other
provisions in Section 4(d) chip away at the protections of Section 4(c).
In an important compromise, Congress permitted continued prospecting
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1) (Westlaw 2009). The reference to the Secretary of
Agriculture, and thus to wilderness areas that the Forest Service oversees, stems from the
fact that no other areas had preexisting aircraft and motorboat use. Other provisions of
the Wilderness Act make specific reference to the Secretary of Agriculture, reflecting the
fact that the Forest Service had wilderness, wild, and primitive areas that it already
managed. As Congress has added more lands under the jurisdiction of other agencies to
the National Wilderness Preservation System, it has often provided the Secretary of the
Interior the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to allow, for example, preexisting
motorboat use. Congress's failure to do so in some instances has led to some confusion.
See, e.g., Isle Royale Boaters Ass'n v. Norton, 154 F. Supp. 2d. 1098, 1117 (W.D. Mich.
2001) (extending 4(d)(1) regulatory discretion to Park Service without statutory
approval), affid, 330 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 2003). In other instances, courts have held that
references to one department cannot extend to another. See, e.g., Brown v. Dep't of
Interior, 679 F.2d 747, 751 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that a reference in Section 4(d) (3) to
"national forest lands" applied only to those lands and not Park Service lands).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (1) ("such measures may be taken as may be necessary in the
control of fire, insects, and diseases, subject to such conditions as the Secretary deems
desirable").
53. Id. § 1133(d)(5). The reference to section 4(d)(5) refers to the revised
numbering of the Wilderness Act, not its original numbering. The original Section
4(d)(5) contained specific provisions regarding the Boundary Waters Canoe Area.
Wilderness Act, § 4(d)(5), 78 Stat. at 891. As mentioned supra note 15, in 1978, Congress
repealed the original Section 4(d) (5) in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act
and renumbered the subsections following it. Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-495, §
4(b), 92 Star. 1649, 1650 (1978).
54. 16U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5).
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for minerals "if such activity is carried on in a manner compatible with
the preservation of the wilderness environment,"55 and it specifically
allowed location of minerals and oil and gas within wilderness areas
until December 31, 1983.56 Congress also created specific rules for
ingress to and egress from located mineral deposits and for patenting
mining claims, and it withdrew all wilderness lands from the mining and
mineral leasing laws as of January 1, 1984. 5 1 Section 4(d)(4) authorizes
the President to locate potential water development projects within
wilderness areas, and it permits pre-established grazing to continue in
wilderness areas subject to "reasonable regulations as are deemed
necessary by the Secretary of Agriculture."5 8 On some issues, the

exceptions in Section 4(d) simply indicate that Congress has not used
the Wilderness Act to assert federal jurisdiction or power beyond that
59
provided for in other laws.
Finally, private rights are recognized within wilderness areas. All of

the prohibitions in Section 4(c) are "subject to existing private rights."6
Section 5(a) addresses private rights of access to lands within wilderness
areas.6 1 Neither of these Sections define exactly what "private rights"
55. Id. § 1133(d) (2).
56. Id. § 1133(d)(3).
57. Id. Section 5(b) also addresses access to "valid mining claims or other valid
occupancies [that] are wholly within a designated national forest wilderness area." Id. §
1134(b). That section grants access "by means which have been or are being customarily
enjoyed with respect to other such areas similarly situated, " subject to "reasonable
regulation." Id. The access to mining section is addressed in Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522
(9th Cir. 1994). On mining claims within wilderness, see Kenneth D. Hubbard et al., The
Wilderness Act's Impact on Mining Activities: Policy Versus Practice, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 591
(1999); Olen Paul Mathews, Amy Haak, & Kathryn Toffenetti, Mining and Wilderness:
IncompatibleUses orJustifiableCompromise?, ENV'T, April 1985, at 12; Kathryn Toffenetti, Valid
MiningRights and Wilderness Areas, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 31 (1985).
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4). The grazing exception continued an exception
recognized under the original L-20 and U regulations. On the reference to the Secretary
of Agriculture, see supra note 51.
59. Id. § 1133(d)(6) ("Nothing in this Act shall constitute an express or implied
claim or denial on the part of the Federal Government as to exemption from State water
laws."); Id. § 1133(d)(7) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting the
jurisdiction or responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and fish in the
national forests."). The provision on water rights has not prevented wilderness advocates
from urging the federal government to claim reserved water rights for wilderness areas.
See, e.g., High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2006);
Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987); see also Karin P. Sheldon, Waterfor
Wilderness, 76 DENY. U. L. REv. 555 (1999)..
60. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
61. Id. § 1134(a). Specifically, Section 5(a) provides:
In any case where State-owned or privately owned land is completely surrounded
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are for purposes of the Act.62
Even without administrative construction and interpretation, then,
the Wilderness Act itself unambiguously dictates some management
decisions and just as unambiguously leaves some to the discretion of the
land management agencies. Thus, as a general rule, the land
management agencies cannot erect permanent structures or build a
permanent road, but they also clearly have discretion to use motor
vehicles for some purposes. As an example of the latter area of
discretion, the Act makes clear that activities using motor vehicles for
search and rescue operations are allowed. Not surprisingly, there are no
reported cases challenging agency decisions regarding those actions
because the Act is so clear on this point.
The apparent clarity of the statute on some issues, however, does not
answer all management questions. Notably, throughout the Wilderness
63
Act, Congress uses the word "necessary" to delimit certain activities.
Courts have often struggled with interpreting the word "necessary" both
in the Constitution and in statutes; meanings can range from something
that is strictly necessary without any other option to something needful
or desirable.6 4 Individual opinions vary as to what activities are
by national forest lands within areas designated by this chapter as wilderness,
such State or private owner shall be given such rights as may be necessary to
assure adequate access to such State-owned or privately owned land by such State
or private owner and their successors in interest, or the State-owned land or
privately owned land shall be exchanged for federally owned land in the same
State of approximately equal value under authorities available to the Secretary of
Agriculture: Provided, however, that the United States shall not transfer to a state
or private owner any mineral interests unless the State or private owner
relinquishes or causes to be relinquished to the United States the mineral
interest in the surrounded land.
62. A discussion of the meaning of this term appears in Glicksman & Coggins,
supra note 7, at 401-02. Cf Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (reviewing regulatory definition of term "valid existing right" in Surface Mining
Act), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 624 (2008).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (minimum requirements must be "necessary"); id. §
1133(d) (1) (authorizing secretaries to take "necessary" action in control of "fire, insects,
and diseases"); id. § 1133(d)(3) (allowing regulation of equipment and facilities
"necessary" for mining operations); id. § 1133(d)(4)(2) (allowing continued grazing
"subject to such reasonable regulations as are deemed necessary by the Secretary of
Agriculture"); id. § 1133(d) (5) (allowing commercial activities "to the extent necessary for
activities which are proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of
the areas"); id. § 1134(a) (state or private landowner surrounded by wilderness "shall be
given such rights as may be necessary to assure adequate access").
64. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-14 (1819)
(interpreting "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper Clause); see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 47, 419 (1992) (interpreting the term "required"
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necessary within wilderness, and what activities are merely desirable.

Similarly, although search and rescue activities seemingly receive a
broad exemption from the Act's prohibitions on motor vehicle use, the
Act does not address whether related activities such as training for
search and rescue operations or body recovery fall within the blanket

exception.
On a broader note, the delicate balance of the prohibitions and the

grants of permission whittle away at the notion of wilderness as an Eden
completely untouched by any human involvement. Rather, wilderness,
like other landscapes, is profoundly ordered and shaped by human

hands, specifically through the often-messy political process in
Congress. Congress sets the boundaries of wilderness, often along
ecologically arbitrary lines.6 5 Congress decides what activities can take
place and what cannot and delineates areas of compromise, sometimes
in ways that do not make intuitive sense.66 Thus, although the public
may see wilderness as the last untouched landscape, the ultimate result is
a carefully created appearance of unmanaged land, albeit one that is not
a complete illusion.
c. Post-1964 wilderness legislation.
With the stroke of President Johnson's pen in 1964, over nine

with reference to an interpretation of term "necessary").
65. Several wilderness areas could exist legally as a single wilderness were it not for a
road separating them, and could probably function ecologically as a single unit of wild
land despite the disruptive effects of the road. For example, only a Forest Service road
separates the Gila Wilderness, the first area protected by proto-wilderness regulation in
1924, from the more recently- established Aldo Leopold Wilderness. Aldo Leopold
Wilderness,
http://www.wilderness.net/index.cfm?fuse=NWPS&sec=wildView&wname=
Aldo%20Leopold (last visited Dec. 23, 2009).
66. For example, Congress banned all private use of "mechanical transport," 16
U.S.C. § 1133(c), but allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to grandfather in "the use of
aircraft or motorboats." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1). The agencies have defined the term
"mechanical transport" to include sailboats. See 43 C.F.R. § 6301.5 (2008); Forest Service
Manual
§ 2320.5(3),
available for download at http://www.fs.fed.us/cgi-bin/
Directives/getdirs/fsm?2300. Many would think it odd that Congress has banned
mechanical transport (and thus, by administrative construction, sailboats) but has allowed
motorboats in wilderness areas, on the assumption that sailboats would be less intrusive of
a visitor's wilderness experience than motorboats. That counterintuitive result, however, is
true in some wilderness areas and has been upheld in the courts, albeit not against a
challenge to the apparent inconsistency of approach. See 36 C.F.R, § 293.16(a), (b)
(permitting motorboats and some mechanical devices, such as portage wheels, but
banning sailboats by implication); Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc) (upholding a regulation barring sailboats against a challenge by a littoral
landowner who claimed all boating regulations interfered with her "valid existing rights";
the regulation did not affect motorboats).
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million acres in fifty-four areas became wilderness areas. These included
lands in thirteen states and, significantly, none in Alaska, which would
later become home to wilderness encompassing eight times the acreage
protected in the original act. Since that date, the National Wilderness
Preservation System has grown to include over 109 million acres in 756
areas spread across 44 states and Puerto Rico. Alaska alone contains
over 57 million acres of statutorily-protected wilderness, well over half
of the total acreage protected.67 Obviously, something led to the growth
of the system.
The 1964 Wilderness Act itself contemplated expansion of the
system. The nine million acres that instantly became wilderness
consisted of lands managed by the Forest Service that it had already
designated administratively as "'wilderness,' 'wild,' or 'canoe."' 68 For
Forest Service areas designated "primitive" and for National Park
Service areas that were roadless and of at least 5000 acres, Congress
established a review and recommendation system with the intention that
it would designate additional lands as wilderness or modify the
boundaries of existing wilderness areas. 69 Congress later added
70
provisions requiring BLM to review its lands.
Two issues underlie the review and recommendation process, and
these arose primarily within the Forest Service. First, the Forest Service

questioned how pure an area must be to qualify as "wilderness." To take
an extreme example, Congress could declare the National Mall to be a
wilderness area if it wanted to do so. Of course, it would then either
67. See Wilderness Statistic Reports, http://www.wilderness.net/index.cfm?fuse=
NWPS&sec=chartResults&chartType=AcreageByStateMost (last visited Dec. 23, 2009).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
69. Id. § 1132(b)-, (c), (e). The review and recommendation systems are similar in
their structure. Both provide that the appropriate agency will review the suitability of
certain lands for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System, make a
recommendation to the President, and the President, in turn, would submit these
recommendations to Congress. No final action would take place on a designation until
Congress acted through specific legislation. The Wilderness Act repeats four times the
provision that an area cannot become statutorily protected wilderness without
congressional action. See id. § 1131 (a) ("no Federal lands shall be designated as 'wilderness
areas' except as provided for in this chapter or by a subsequent Act"); id. § 1132 (b) ("Each
recommendation of the President for designation as 'wilderness' shall become effective
only if so provided by an Act of Congress."); id. § 1132(c) ("A recommendation of the
President for designation as wilderness shall become effective only if so provided by an Act
of Congress."); id. § 1132 (e) ("The President shall advise the United States Senate and the
House of Representatives of his recommendations with respect to such modification or
adjustment and such recommendations shall become effective only on the same manner
as provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of this section.").
70. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (Westlaw 2009); see also Glicksman & Coggins, supra note
7, at 391-92 (discussing status of review processes).
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have to enact special legislation excepting various permanent
installations such as the Smithsonian museums and the presidential and
war monuments and memorials, or direct the Park Service to eliminate
those permanent structures. Either course of action would likely create
intense political conflict. Most wilderness designation questions did not
present such extreme choices. For the Forest Service in particular,
however, any disqualifying feature in an undeveloped area, e.g., an
abandoned cabin or overgrown timber road, rendered that area too
impure to qualify as wilderness. A dedication to theoretical purity did
not explain the Forest Service's insistence on it; rather, the Forest
Service also knew that rejection of lands for addition to the National
Wilderness Preservation System would allow the Forest Service to retain
broader managerial discretion over those lands under more flexible laws
such as the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act7 1 or the later National
Forest Management Act.72 Both statutes recognize wilderness as a valid
use for the national forests,7 3 but they also allow the Forest Service to
employ a wider range of management techniques and relieve it from the
obligation to employ a minimum requirements analysis to justify using
motorized equipment and motor Vehicles. To preserve this flexibilitybut also to promote the idea that wilderness should consist of pristine
lands without marks of human incursion-the Forest Service staunchly
opposed the Eastern Wilderness Areas Act, taking the position that no
lands in the eastern United States could qualify as wilderness.7 4
Congress overcame that objection and has ever since resisted the strong
purity view.
The second question that arose in the context of wilderness
designation was what would happen with lands once the agency
inventoried the lands, presented them with a recommendation to
Congress, and Congress acted on the recommendation. The agencies
typically took the view that the lands were then released from further
wilderness consideration. Again, the political advantage to this view was
that, if accepted, it would free the lands for more flexible management
by the agencies. Congress did not adopt a strong view of the release
question in subsequent wilderness legislation although it did consistently
use language suggesting that inventoried lands were released from
71. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531.
72. Id. §§ 1601-1610.
73. See 16 U.S.C. § 529 ("The establishment and maintenance of areas of wilderness
are consistent with the purposes and provisions of [the Multiple Use Sustained Yield
Act]."); id. § 1 6 04(g) (3) (A).
74. See CRAIG W. ALLIN, THE POLITICS OF WILDERNESS PRESERVATION 187 (2d ed.

2008); ScoTr, supra note 16, at 66-72.
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further consideration as wilderness.7 5 The courts have struggled with the
question of whether this language constitutes a permanent release of the
lands from all consideration of wilderness values.76
Much wilderness legislation of the 1980s began as a response to the
Forest Service's roadless area review and evaluation (RARE) process.
The Forest Service began the first iteration of RARE in response to the
enactment of the Wilderness Act in 1964. With the adoption of the
National Environmental Policy Act in 1970,11 the courts required the
Forest Service to scrap the first RARE 78 which prompted the Forest
Service to begin compiling RARE II. Several states, including
California, challenged the environmental documentation used to support
the RARE II recommendations for wilderness and, in particular, for
releasing inventoried lands from further wilderness consideration. Their
legal challenges prevailed in the courts. 7 9 Without proper environmental
analysis of recommending that inventoried lands not be protected as
wilderness, the Forest Service could not legally manage these lands for
all multiple uses.
As a response to the RARE II litigation, the Forest Service initially
contemplated the preparation of a new environmental analysis, which it
dubbed RARE III. Congress short-circuited that process by enacting a
series of state-specific wilderness bills in the 1980s. (For that reason,
President Reagan signed more individual wilderness bills than any other
president.8") A result of this spate of legislation was the routinization of
75. The standard release language concerning such areas provides that "such areas
need not be managed for the purpose of protecting their suitability for wilderness
designation." See, e.g., Maine Wilderness Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-401, § 5(b)(3), 104
Stat. 863, 864 (1990); Kentucky Wilderness Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-197, § 4(b) (5), 99
Stat. 1351, 1352 (1985); Georgia Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-514, § 5(b)(3), 98
Stat. 2416, 2417 (1984).
76. See, e.g., Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1114, 1138
(9th Cir. 2008) (requiring the agency to consider potential wilderness uses for lands even
after it has reported to Congress); Lands Council v. Martin, 479 F.3d 636, 640 (9th Cir.
2007) (requiring potential impact on wilderness quality of lands to be analyzed in NEPA
documentation even though the lands have been released); Smith v. U.S. Forest Serv., 33
F.3d 1072, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1994).
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (Westlaw 2009).
78. See Wyo. Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
79. See California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980), affid in partsub nom.
California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982). The district court was quite critical of the
USFS's review of potential wilderness areas. In its view of the USFS's environmental
documentation, "[m]ajor features of an area are reduced to highly generalized
descriptions such as 'mountain' or 'river'. One can hypothesize how the Grand Canyon
might be rated: 'Canyon with river, little vegetation."' California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp.
at 486 n.22.
80. See SCO-r, supra note 16, at 83.
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certain statutory inclusions and the formation of boilerplate language to

cover some of the recurrent issues. Two such provisions were the
inclusion of protection for "valid existing rights"-as opposed to
"existing private rights," the term used in the 1964 Wilderness Act-and
language regarding the release of Forest Service areas from further
review for possible inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation

System.

81

2. Regulatory definitions governing wilderness management after
1964.
As stated above, although the Wilderness Act contains specific and
express directives on some questions, it also leaves many management
decisions open to agency discretion. For example, it is clear that an
agency may use motorized vehicles for search and rescue operations.
The statute does not answer many important questions relative to the
effective management of wilderness areas, such as what constitutes a
"motor vehicle" or "mechanical transport" that the act generally
prohibits.82 Although standard rules of statutory construction would
indicate that the terms "motor vehicles," "motorboats," and "mechanical

transport" must each mean something slightly different in their
coverage,8 3 the language of the prohibitions leaves a great deal of room
for administrative interpretation. For example, one could imagine that an
agency might define "mechanical transport" in a way that would include
wheelchairs. Indeed, Congress acknowledged that possibility in the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), when it "reaffirmed" in section
507 that the Wilderness Act neither prohibited disabled people from
81. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (describing release language and
judicial reaction). Other language of lesser significance has also become boilerplate in
recent wilderness additions. For example, some provisions of the 1964 Wilderness Act
make specific reference to the Secretary of Agriculture. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (4) (1)
(Westiaw 2009) (granting discretion to the Secretary of Agriculture to grandfather in preexisting motorboat use). Subsequent wilderness legislation has provided that the term
"Secretary of Agriculture" would read as "Secretary of the Interior," thus granting the same
authority to the Interior agencies (National Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
and Bureau of Land Management) who also manage wilderness. See, e.g., Isle Royale
Boaters Ass'n v. Norton, 154 F. Supp. 1098 (W.D. Mich. 2001), affd, 330 F.3d 777 (6th Cir.
2003).
82. For a classic debate over the possible scope of a ban on vehicles within a park,
compare H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
607-08 (1958), and Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71
HARV. L REV. 630, 662-63 (1958).
83. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Cmties. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995) (noting "reluctance to treat statutory
terms as surplusage").
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using wheelchairs in wilderness areas nor required that the land

management agencies make reasonable accommodations for
wheelchairs.84 Bicycles, particularly mountain bikes, are now popular
forms of recreational transportation in back country areas but the land
management agencies prohibit them in wilderness areas because they are
"mechanical transport."8 5 Although the land management agencies lack
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12207(c)(1) (Westlaw 2009) ("[N]othing in the Wilderness Act is to
be construed as prohibiting the use of a wheelchair in a wilderness area by an individual
whose disability requires use of a wheelchair, and consistent with the Wilderness Act no
agency is required to provide any form of special treatment or accommodation, or to
construct any facilities or modify any conditions of lands within a wilderness area in order
to facilitate such use."). The ADA also defines "wheelchair" for purposes of the act to
mean "a device designed solely for use by a mobility-impaired person for locomotion, that
is suitable for use in an indoor pedestrian area." Id. § 12207(c) (2). Thus disabled people
can use electric-powered wheelchairs if necessary, but they cannot use a wheelchair
powered by an internal combustion engine within wilderness since such a vehicle would
not be suitable for indoor use.
85. 36 C.F.R. § 4.30(d) (1) (2008) (National Park Service); 43 C.F.R. § 6301.5 (2008)
(Bureau of Land Management); Forest Service Manual § 2320.5(3) (2007), available at
http://www.wilderness.net/index.cfm?fuse=NWPS&sec=legisPolicy
(navigate to "Forest
Service Policy for Wilderness Management") ("mechanical transport" includes "[a]ny
contrivance for moving people or material in or over land, water, or air, having moving
parts, that provides a mechanical advantage to the user and is powered by a living or
nonliving power source [including but not limited to] bicycles."). One author has argued
that the Wilderness Act permits the use of bicycles in wilderness areas. See Theodore J.
Stroll, Congress's Intent in BanningMechanical Transportin the Wilderness Act of 1964, 12 PENN
ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 459 (2004). Stroll notes that the Forest Service did not ban bicycles in
its original regulations governing activities in wilderness areas and did not clearly state a
ban until 1977. Id. at 464. He urges that the term "mechanical transport" only includes
vehicles that are powered by motors or are heavy, bulky, and scarring. Id. at 468. Others
insist that the statutory terms of the Wilderness Act itself, specifically the ban on
"mechanical transport," necessitate a ban on bicycles. See, e.g., Douglas W. Scott, Mountain
Biking in Wilderness: Some History, WILD EARTH, Spring 2003, at 23, available at
http://www.leaveitwild.org/docs/report-mountain-biking-spring-03.pdf.
The anti-bicycle advocates make a very strong and convincing case that bicycles are
forms of "mechanical transport" banned by. the terms of the Wilderness Act itself (subject
to the minimum requirements exception for administrative needs). Under normal rules of
statutory construction, courts hold that they must give each term used by Congress a
distinct meaning, since Congress would not have spelled out each term separately if it did
not intend the terms t6 have somewhat different meanings. See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
534 U.S. 19, 31. (2001); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmties. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 698 (1995) (noting "reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage"). The
Wilderness Act contains such a list of many terms, and the intended different meanings
are found in the treatment of aircraft and motorboats. Those forms of transportation are
specifically listed as distinct banned devices in Section 4(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c), and are
alone subject to the exception in Section 4(d)(1), which allows the Secretary of
Agriculture to continue private motorboat or aircraft uses if they predated the
establishment of the wilderness area. Aircraft and motorboats easily fit within the general
term "motor vehicles," and Congress could have excepted them in Section 4(d)(1) without
specifically listing them in Section 4(c). Yet Congress saw fit to ban motorboats and aircraft
specifically, and to grant them somewhat different treatment. Similarly, then, the term
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unified regulations defining the activities that may take place within
wilderness, many of their86regulations prohibit the same things or require

the same considerations.

3. Judicialdefinition of wilderness activities since 1964.
Parties adversely affected by the actions of federal agencies can seek
judicial review of those actions, 87 and the actions of the land
management agencies interpreting and applying the Wilderness Act are
no exception. In order to fully investigate and analyze various factors
underlying judicial interpretations of the Wilderness Act, it is useful first
to survey 'and understand how courts, in general, have treated agency
decisions and the grounds on which they based their rulings.
The earliest interpretations of the Wilderness Act before the courts
"mechanical transport" must include uses that are not motor-powered because Congress
treated motor vehicles and motorized equipment separately. In addition, Congress
specifically singled out "expanding settlement and growing mechanization" accompanying
population growth-and, tellingly, not simply motorized uses-in its statement of policy
supporting the adoption of the Wilderness Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
Additional evidence from the history of the wilderness movement supports the view
that the terms "mechanical" and "mechanized" refer to more than just motorized uses. See
Scott, supra note 16, at 23 (narrating the history of bicycles with reference to the views of
Benton MacKaye); see also SUTrER, supra note 16, at 185. Early wilderness advocates wished
to escape the civilizing effects of the wheel generally and not simply motor-powered
wheeled devices.
Even if the term "mechanical transport" in the Wilderness Act does not include
bicycles as a matter of law, it is quite clear that the land management agencies have the
discretion to ban them, as they have. Whatever the imagined policy benefits there might
be to having bicycle access into wilderness areas, see Stroll, supra note 85, at 481-82,
including bicycles within a regulatory definition of "mechanical transport" is certainly not
arbitrary and capricious.
86. Professors Glicksman and Coggins argue that the National Wilderness
Preservation System is not "designed to function as an integrated whole." Glicksman &
Coggins, supra note 7, at 393; see also id. ("certainly, the management of official wilderness
areas by four separate agencies-each with its own traditions, missions, and governing
standards-has no pretense of uniformity or even of coordination."). One way in which
the agencies have better coordinated and informed their decisionmaking is through the
examples discussed in the "Minimum Requirements Decision Guide" created by the
Arthur Carhart National Wilderness Training Center. See SCoTT, supra note 16, at 133.
These modules walk managers through various considerations of what is possible and
practicable in wilderness and help them to prepare for the scenarios they may face. The
modules cover issues that the original drafters of the Wilderness Act probably did not
consider, such as dealing with nonnative invasive species, wilderness restoration, and
wheelchair access within wilderness. Wilderness managers must confront these and other
challenges as the number of wilderness areas and the amount of acreage under
supervision have increased. The guides are available at Wilderness.net, Minimum
Requirements Decision Guide, http://www.wilderness.net/index.cfm?fuse=MRDG (last
visited Dec. 23, 2009).
87. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Westdaw 2009).

HeinOnline -- 29 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 88 2010

20101

WILDERNESS AND THE COURTS

involved the ban on motor vehicles, and these cases involved no agency
interpretation of the statute. 8 The courts have interpreted the ban on
commercial enterprises to include commercial fishing 89 and a program
to stock fish run by volunteers but designed to support a commercial
fishery,9" but have upheld a program to control predators that supported
grazing within a wilderness area (the grazing itself being a permissible
grandfathered use).9 1 The courts have struck down agency decisions
protecting historic structures as falling within the ban on permanent
structures 92 but have allowed gear caches for commercial guides.9 3 To
the extent that the agencies can authorize some activities in wilderness
only if "necessary,"9 4 courts have required that agencies provide
somewhat careful reasoning to justify insect-suppression programs 95 or
commercial guide services that are shown to harm the resource. 96 Private
rights in wilderness may include access rights 97 and littoral owners'
rights to lake surface navigation ,98 but many access rights are still
subject to reasonable regulations, including restrictions that the person
seeking access use pack animals only. 99 Although there have been some
tort claims arising within wilderness areas, the courts have held that
these claims are barred under the discretionary function exception to the

88. *See McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1965) (motorcycle);
United States v. Gregg, 290 F. Supp. 706 (W.D. Wash. 1968) (aircraft). The Eighth Circuit
has found that there is no implied treaty right to motor vehicle use for Native Americans
seeking to hunt and fish within wilderness areas. United States v. Gotchnik, 222 F.3d 506
(8th Cir. 2000).
89. Alaska Wildlife Alliance v.Jensen, 108 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1997).
90. Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc), discussed at length infra note 186 and accompanying text.
91. Forest Guardians v. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., 309 F.3d 1141 (9th
Cir. 2002) (upholding lethal controls on mountain lions).
92. See Olympic Park Assocs. v. Mainella, No. C04-5732FDB, 2005 WL 1871114 (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 1, 2005); see also Wilderness Watch v. U.S. Forest Serv., 143 F. Supp.. 2d 1186
(D. Mont. 2000) (protecting area under Wild and Scenic Rivers Act).
93. See Wilderness Watch v. Robertson, No. CIV. 92-740 (TFH), 1998 WL 1750033
(D.D.C. Aug. 31, 1998).
94. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
95. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 663 F. Supp. 556 (D.D.C. 1987); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F.
Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1987); see also Glicksman & Coggins, supra note 7, at 403-07 (discussing
the affirmative obligation to protect wilderness).
96. See High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2004).
97. See Barnes v. Babbitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Ariz. 2004); Nelson v. United
States, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
98. SeeStupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
99. SeeClouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1994). On the related questions
defining of "existing private rights" and "valid existing rights," see Glicksman & Coggins,
supra note 7, at 401-02, 409.
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Federal Torts Claims Act '°0 because the Wilderness Act itself dictates
the condition of the land (for injuries to visitors)1 ' or th& management
of the land (for injury to neighboring property)."0 2 This brief glance at
the case law arising under the Wilderness Act offers one a sense that
courts are generally protective of wilderness, perhaps even more than
the agencies charged with managing it.
B. The Development of the Wilderness Ideal andModern Critiques.
Attitudes towards wilderness have changed considerably in
American history, Originally, settlers of the colonies saw wilderness as a
threatening place, one filled with "savage men, wild beasts and still
stranger creatures of the imagination."'0 3 Nevertheless, many Americans
imagined the new world full of shining cities on the hill, and embraced
the beauty of new-world wildness and savagery.'I This more accepting
approach to wilderness-the belief that wilderness offered desirable
solitude and spiritual renewal-pervaded the thinking of the advocates
of wilderness protection which in turn culminated in the Wilderness Act.
Wilderness protection, to them, represented a last-ditch effort to
preserve untouched and unsullied landscapes. More recently, however,
10 5
scholars have reexamined the concept and functions of wilderness.
This more realistic, less romantic approach takes a more nuanced view
of wilderness and sees possible difficulties raised by wilderness as a
concept. Although many of these writers emphatically embrace
protection of wilderness as it is understood, they also recognize that
efforts at such protection can potentially undermine attempts to protect
other, less pristine but equally important landscapes. 10 6 More recent
ecological thinking has also bolstered this later view of wilderness by
demonstrating and emphasizing that ecosystems are dynamic systems
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (Westlaw 2009).
101. See Zumwalt v. United States, 928 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1991) (falling into cave);
Ambros-Marcial v. United States, 377 F. Supp. 2d 767 (D. Ariz. 2005); Wright v. United
States, 868 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Tenn. 1994) (failing to remove hazardous tree), aftfd, No.
95-5175, 1996 WL 172119 (6th Cir. April 11, 1996).
102. See McDougal v. U.S. Forest Serv., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Or. 2002) (allowing
wildfire to burn); McDaniel v. United States, 899 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (failing to
control southern pine beetles).
103. NASH, supra note 16, at 24.
104. Id. at 44-66.
105. See J. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson, Introduction to THE GREAT NEW
WILDERNESS DEBATE 2 (J. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson eds., 1998).
106. William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back into the Wrong Nature,
in UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 69 (William Cronon
ed., 1996).
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that change rapidly, often through human intervention. These scientific
observations undermine the very concept of virgin, untouched, and
unsullied landscapes.
1. Uncriticallypositive conceptions of the wilderness ideal.
The concept of wilderness as a desirable place to go and to be set
American thinking about wilderness apart from its European
antecedents. Commentators agree that the thinking of Emerson and
Thoreau accelerated a shift in American thinking towards wilderness as
a benign or even beneficial place to be. °7 These writers signaled a shift
from thinking of wilderness as "an insecure and uncomfortable
environment against which civilization had waged an unceasing
struggle."'0 8 Instead, writers such as Emerson and Thoreau saw in
wilderness the possibility of community with the divine and of
"attaining moral perfection."' 10 9
Several figures, including Bob Marshall, Aldo Leopold, Arthur
Carhart, Benton MacKay, and Howard Zahniser, can claim intellectual
parentage of the effort to create modem wilderness protection in legal
form. Their efforts were not created in a vacuum, however. Someone
had to champion the idea of protecting large swaths of federally-owned
lands and to devise administrative structures that would receive their
ideas, value them and, in turn, eventually protect wilderness. President
Theodore Roosevelt can claim some credit for laying the groundwork
for federal protection of wilderness. 1 0 A noted conservationist,
Roosevelt sought counsel from John Muir about the protection of forest
reserves, both those established by President Cleveland and those that
were proposed for protection. 11 ' Roosevelt's first appointee as Chief of
the Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot, adhered to a strongly utilitarian
conception of the national forests, one that was often at odds with
preserving beautiful places for the value of their beauty alone without
regard to immediate extractive benefits that could be derived from
them." 2' Nevertheless, this utilitarian ideal laid the groundwork for

107. See NASH, supra note 16, at 66.
108. Id. at 8.
109. Id. at 86.
110. President Johnson acknowledged the role of President Roosevelt in his signing
statement for the Wilderness Act. 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: LYNDON B.JOHNSON 1963-64, 103.
111. See NASH, supra note 16, at 138-39.
112. See id. at 163 (describing different sides in the battle over damming Hetch
Hetchy Valley for water supply to San Francisco).
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others within the Forest Service
to develop the conception of lands left
3
alone for their own sake."
The passage of the Wilderness Act and its approval by President
Lyndon Johnson on September 3, 1964, constituted a signal achievement
for the wilderness movement. Legally, the Wilderness Act granted
statutory rather than administrative protection for over nine million acres
of public lands and set into motion the review system that would
eventually result in the inclusion of millions more acres in the National
Wilderness Preservation System. Intellectually, Zahniser's vision and
the vision of other, earlier advocates of wilderness protection won out.
That vision has, by and large, captured the day for popular conceptions
of wilderness. In public polling data, wilderness protection receives
overwhelming support, even though those data show that the public may
not necessarily understand what, legally, wilderness is, what can go on
in it, or the purposes and uses of it. These polls, which have been
conducted by researchers within the U.S. Forest Service, demonstrate
that the American people overwhelmingly approve of wilderness
protection and desire more acreage to be added. Interestingly, most of
the features that the public values in wilderness do not necessarily jibe
with the recreational goals of Marshall and his followers. Topping the
list of values rated "very important" or "extremely important" by poll
respondents were protecting water quality, wildlife habitat, and air
quality. 114 Less tangible values such as protecting "for future
generations," protecting a "future option to visit" the area, and "[j]ust
knowing it exists" all polled higher than actually using the area for
present recreation.l 5 Although Marshall and his prot6g6s wanted to use
wilderness, many Americans are happy with the nonuse values it
provides.
2. More nuanced conceptions of wilderness.
President Johnson's signing of the Wilderness Act on September 3,
1964, marked a singular achievement for wilderness advocates in the
113. See OELSCHLAEGER, supra note 16, at 209-10 (placing Aldo Leopold in the
context of Roosevelt and Pinchot).
114. Rudy M. Schuster et al., The Social Value of Wilderness, in THE MULTIPLE VALUES
OF WILDERNESS 113, 116 (H. Ken Cordell, John C. Bergstrom & J.M. Bowker eds., 2005).
Cordell in particular has been involved in several studies of how the public views
wilderness.
115. Id. Additional studies also show that political support for wilderness extends
beyond the stereotypical wilderness user, who is an affluent, educated white male. See
Cassandra Johnson et al., Wilderness Value Difference by Immigration, Race/Ethnicity, Gender,
and Socioeconomic Status, in MULTIPLE VALUES, supra note 114, at 144, 154-55.

HeinOnline -- 29 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 92 2010

2010]

WILDERNESS AND THE COURTS

United States. l"' As debates raged about what lands to add to the
wilderness system, however, academic observations about the
environment generally and wilderness specifically would respond to the
uncritical views of wilderness defenders such as Marshall and Zahniser.
The changes in perception of nature generally and wilderness
specifically fall into two categories: the humanities and the sciences.
These new observations now provide additional perspective on the legal
questions surrounding wilderness management.
Scholars within the humanities have questioned the uncritical view
of wilderness. To summarize, much of the newer scholarship attacks the
wilderness ideal or the "received wilderness idea ... [as] ethnocentric,
androcentric, phallocentric, unscientific, unphilosophic, impolitic,
outmoded, even genocidal."' 1" One prominent critic is William Cronon.
In an essay entitled The Trouble With Wilderness, Cronon attacked
wilderness protection to the extent that it privileged some landscapes
over others.' 18 Many traditional environmentalists interpreted Cronon's
remarks as an attack on wilderness itself, which Cronon disputed.
Nevertheless, Cronon claims at the outset of his essay that wilderness "is
a product of... civilization, and [that it] hides its unnaturalness behind a
mask that is all the more beguiling because it seems so natural." 9
"Wilderness," argues Cronon, "is [thus] part of the problem" in the
troublesome relationship between humans and their environment. 2 ° In
particular, protection of wilderness permits people "to privilege some
parts of nature at the expense of others,"'' allowing people to develop
psychological permission to despoil landscapes that are, after all,
profane by definition because they are not wilderness.
Ecological thinking has also changed considerably since Zahniser
shepherded the wilderness bill through Congress. At that time, the view
of natural systems was based on slow development of an area to a
climax or mature state. Thus, a late successional hardwood forest would
be the ultimate development of some geographic areas. Should a

116. In an official opinion, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti noted that the
Wilderness Act was the culmination of fifteen years of "almost unprecedented citizen
participation." Rights-of-Way Across National Forests, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 243, 267 (1980).
117. Callicott & Nelson, supra note 105, at 2.
118. Cronon, supra note 106. Some have claimed that this essay is "largely
unoriginal," Callicott & Nelson, supra note 105, at 12, although Cronon alone has borne
the brunt of the anti-wilderness criticisms, unlike the critics who arguably made his points
first.
119. Cronon, supra note 106, at 69.
120. Id. at 70.
121. Id. at 86.
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disruption occur in that area from, say, a fire, the system would recover
and move ineluctably toward the climax state, returning to it eventually.
This type of thinking-embodied in the early work of Eugene Odum and
other pioneers in the field of ecology 122-constituted more complex
examination of ecological systems as compared to distinct fields such as
botany and zoology, which tended to study their subjects in isolation.
The writings of scientists such as Daniel Botkin have nevertheless
changed that teleological vision of the natural world.1 23 Rather than
conceiying of natural systems reaching a state of equilibrium, Botkin
demonstrated that ecological systems are characterized by chaotic
transformations. Some of those transformations occur because of losses
of species, such as the American chestnut in eastern hardwood forests,
or the invasion of exotic species. Some transformations occur because of
deliberate human manipulation of the environment-for example,
through the use of fire. Of course, the two are not completely separate,
24
because human effects can then trigger nonhuman responses.1
If Botkin and others are right, then the concept of wilderness
embraced by Marshall, Leopold, Zahniser, and others falls short of this
more complex understanding of nature. Rather than trying to manage an
area to resemble what it would look like if it never experienced intensive
human management, land managers now face much more deliberate
choices about manipulating nature to restore it to a particular time period
(e.g., what .it looked like pre-European contact, what it looked like
before the establishment of aboriginal peoples, or what it looked like
even earlier) and determining the ecological processes at work at the
selected time. Similarly, modem research has posed several questions
that earlier wilderness advocates did not face as starkly. As mentioned
earlier, disease wiped out almost all American chestnuts in eastern
hardwood forests, such that the chestnut no longer predominates other
tree species. Genetic research promises new strains of American
chestnuts that can resist the blight. Advocates on either side could debate
whether planting such genetically modified trees is "natural" or not and
they can also debate whether such a plan would promise ecological
advantages or not. Whether to reintroduce such a new strain into a
wilderness area would pose an even more complex question given the

122. See, e.g., Eugene P. Odum, The Strategy of Ecosystem Development, 164 SCIENCE 262
(1969). Later in his career, Odum embraced the more complex view of ecosystems to be
described below.
123. See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990).
124. See id. at 51-54 (describing transformation of Eastern hardwood forests).
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language and goals of the Wilderness Act.
Observations such as Botkin's and Cronon's do not negate the good
reasons to protect wilderness. These authors nevertheless make
abundantly clear that wilderness is not some objective state of nature but
a constructed reality. Most important from the perspective of wilderness
management, the recognition that wilderness is constructed raises many
questions about the project of wilderness restoration. To many outsiders,
the notion of "wilderness restoration" is somewhat oxymoronic, because
they think that wilderness is already the environment as it should be. 25
Restoring wilderness now occupies a considerable amount of time for
wilderness thinkers and managers.
Most important for purposes of this Article, the new scholarship in
the sciences and the humanities starkly reveals the problems facing
wilderness protection through the legal system. When advocates turnas they must inevitably-to law for the protection of wilderness, the
human construction of this supposed state of untouched nature should
become all the more obvious. The creation of a statute necessarily
entails political compromise within the houses of Congress and between
the legislative and the executive branches. Management of the areas
selected for protection involves application of administrative discretion
and professional best judgment that could be grounded in traditions
somewhat at odds with the traditional intellectual roots of wilderness
protection. Management also implicates the financial and other
limitations of the agencies. Finally, judicial interpretation of the law and
its application to specific agency actions draws in the biases of judges as
practiced interpreters and construers of legal texts and the limitations of
the legal system (e.g. application of precedent). If the ideal of wilderness
12 6
is the Garden of Eden, the actuality of it lies far from the ideal.

III. How COURTS

REACT TO AGENCY WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT

DECISIONS

The previous section laid the groundwork, from the statutory and
regulatory history and background to the intellectual foundations for

125. See Daniel Rohlf & Douglas L. Honnold, Managing the Balances of Nature: The
Legal Framework of Wilderness Management, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 271-73 (1988) (discussing
the paradox of human intervention and the distinction between preservation and
restoration of wilderness).
126. Grant Gilmore's observation about legal systems seems apropos: "In Heaven,"
Gilmore wrote, "there will be no law and the lion will lie down with the lamb... In Hell,
there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed." GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 1-11 (1977).

HeinOnline -- 29 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 95 2010

96

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 29:62

wilderness protection, for examining the range of decisions that the land
management agencies have actually made in carrying out their duties to
manage wilderness. This section develops the central proposition of this
Article, namely, that courts have a marked tendency to decide cases in
favor of what can generally be described as traditional notions of
wilderness protection. Specifically, courts apply much more rigorous
scrutiny of agency determinations that arguably detract from wilderness
protection than the scrutiny they might apply in other contexts both
within and outside of environmental law, and courts overwhelmingly
vote to affirm agency actions that protect wilderness more than they
might in other contexts, again, both within and outside of environmental
law. This section starts with a close analysis of three key cases involving
judicial review of agency decisions that were held to violate the
Wilderness Act. This analysis is intended to show that the language and
reasoning of those cases would lead one analyzing these decisions to
develop an intuitive sense that the agencies tend to receive unexpectedly
high scrutiny -of their decisions in the wilderness context. To be
complete, and to provide a possible counterpoint to the jurisprudential
analysis offered here, the case analysis also includes a discussion of the
only decision from the Supreme Court that involves an issue closely
related to wilderness management, namely management of wilderness
study areas. Then, to show that the textual analysis and resulting
intuitive sense also has numerical support, this section presents
preliminary findings based on data about the principal court cases
involving wilderness management decisions.
An overriding observation about courts and agencies underlies
these two ways (i.e., textual analysis of select cases and tallying results
in all cases) of approaching the problem. One may reasonably
hypothesize that administrative agencies should win most of their cases
in court. This hypothesis stems from the underlying legal rules that
agencies face in court challenges: in lawsuits against administrative
agencies courts pay some level of deference to the judgment of those
agencies. This level of deference ranges from very little, such as the
deference paid to an agency position first laid out in a brief filed in
litigation,' 27 to a great deal, such as an agency's decision not to pursue
an enforcement action.' 2 8 Based on the stated rules in court decisions,
however, an analyst would figure that an agency would win an
127. SeeBowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 US. 204, 212-13 (1988).
128. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that a presumption of
complete unreviewability protects an agency decision not to pursue an enforcement
action).
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overwhelming number of its cases. Indeed, losses in court should stand
out and could be explained because the agency simply refused to follow
its statutory instructions or acted arbitrarily or because the court felt free
to second-guess the agency's decision or deny it the requisite level of
deference. A body of cases that stretches over a long period of time in
which courts reject agency decisions should stand out in the body of
overall body of administrative review decisions.
The Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council 129 provides the foundational framework for
examining judicial review of at least some types of administrative
actions. Chevron set forth a two-part test for courts to use in evaluating
whether to defer to an agency's construction of a statute. In the first part,
courts must determine whether the statute is ambiguous. If Congress has
unambiguously answered the question presented to the agency, "that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 13 0 If the
court determines that the statute is ambiguous, thus leaving room for
administrative construction, the court must defer to the agency if "the
'
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."131
If Chevron represented the judiciary's abdication of its role through
capitulation to administrative agencies-as some critics maintained it
did"'3 2-then one might predict that agency win rates would rise after
Chevron decision.
33
More recently, the Court clarified in United States v. Mead Corp.1
that this two-part test does not apply to every instance of judicial review
of an agency's action. Rather, in determining whether Chevron
deference or a lesser level of deference would apply, the court evaluates
"'the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control."" 34 The Court has made clear that full deference under Chevron
applies when an agency action is based on a sufficiently formal process,
such as promulgating a legislative rule following the notice and
comment procedures established under the Administrative Procedure

129. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
130. Id. at 842-43.
131. Id. at 843.
132. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO.
LJ. 833, 859 (2001); Seidenfeld, supra note 1.
133. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
134. Id. at 219 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
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Act, 135 but other types of agency actions may receive more or less
36
deference depending on the circumstances. 1
With those overarching observations, one can proceed to examine
both the language of the case law interpreting the Wilderness Act and
some numerical information about the cases as a whole. Both types of
evidence will show that the cases interpreting administrative
constructions of the Wilderness Act depart from the general expectations
that an analyst might have.
A. Case Studies
Several key decisions evidence a judicial tendency to look through a
gimlet eye at administrative decisions that arguably cut corners on
wilderness protection. The language in these decisions demonstrates a
heightened level of examination even when the courts claim that they
are reviewing the agency's actions with deference. These rulings have
become influential in future decisions about the duty of agencies in
administering wilderness areas. Although it may be difficult to measure
the influence of a particular decision, these cases nevertheless
demonstrate that courts may employ a more exacting standard of judicial
1 37
review than may be expected based on the stated standard of review.
To the extent that the historical period is relevant, one of the cases
comes from the early 1970s; the other two were decided within six
months of each other in the mid 2000s.
1. Parkerv. United States.
The 1964 Wilderness Act contemplated adding areas to the 9.3
million acres originally established as wilderness.' 38 This decision found
expression in one of the Act's compromise provisions. Ultimately, the
Act specifically endorsed the Forest Service's classification of areas
under the U regulations as "wilderness," "wild," "canoe," and
"primitive" and provided instant protection for the first three
135. Id. at 229.
136. See Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2473
(2009) (holding that an agency memorandum interpreting the relevant statute and
regulations is entitled to "a measure of deference").
137. One linguistic form of evidence that further supports this point is the number
of cases in which the courts invoke the language of Section 2(c) of the Wilderness Act
describing wilderness areas as these "untrammeled by man" or "where man himself is a
visitor who does not remain." 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (c) (Westlaw 2009). Fifty-six decisions quote
this language, yet few, if any, of the cases interpreting the Wilderness Act actually parse its
meaning. The courts nevertheless seem eager to make reference to it.
138. Id. § 1132(b), (c).
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designations.' 3 9 For areas that the Forest Service had classified as
"primitive," the act created a review process and directed the Forest
Service to make a recommendation for each area "as to its suitability or
unsuitability for preservation as wilderness."1 40 (The suitability review
culminated in the RARE studies discussed above.14 1) The act directed
the Forest Service to submit its recommendation to the President, who
would transmit that recommendation to Congress with any emendations
he saw fit to make. 142 In the meantime, Congress directed the Forest
Service to manage all areas under review under the U regulations until
Congress had acted on any recommendation, and that the
recommendations for full protection as wilderness4 3 would "become
effective only if so provided by an Act of Congress."'
Two parts of the statute creating this review process---one general
and one specific-deserve 'attention here. The general language
preserved the discretion of the President to add additional lands to his
wilderness recommendations.'" The specific language provided:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, the Secretary of
Agriculture may complete his review and delete such area as may be
necessary, but not to exceed seven thousand acres, from the southern
tip of the Gore Range-Eagles Nest Primitive Area, Colorado, if the
Secretary determines that such action is in the public interest. 145
The Gore Range-Eagles Nest Primitive Area (now the Eagles Nest
Wilderness Area 146 ) lies just north of Vail, Colorado. 147 The proviso
specifically addressing the exclusion of up to 7000 acres within that
area, and placing that decision initially within the discretion of the
Secretary of Agriculture, not the President, constituted one of the many

139. Id. § 1132 (a), (b).
140. Id. § 1132(b).
141. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
142. Specifically, Section 1132(b) permitted the President to increase the size of any
primitive areas "by not more than five thousand acres with no more than one thousand
two hundred and eighty acres of such increase in any one compact unit;" larger additions
had to receive the approval of Congress before taking effect. 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (b).
143. Id.
144. Id. ("Nothing herein contained shall limit the President in proposing, as part of
his recommendations to Congress, the alteration of existing boundaries of primitive areas
or recommending the addition of any contiguous area of national forest lands
predominantly of wilderness value.").
145. Id.
146. SeeAct ofJuly 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-352, 90 Stat. 870 (1976).
147. ROTH, supra note 16, at 26.
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political compromises that made their way into the Wilderness Bill on
its way to enactment.
Wilderness advocates, including many residents of Vail who wished
to protect the scenery near their growing town with its burgeoning
tourist industry, became concerned about a proposed timber sale in East
Meadow Creek, an area to the west of the primitive area that the Forest
Service had targeted for timber harvest of up to 5 million board feet.148
East Meadow Creek lay entirely outside of the primitive area. The Forest
Service had excluded it from further wilderness review because it had a
small bug road running through it, some abandoned cabins, temporary
corrals, and mining claims; in addition, the Denver Water Board had an
interest in developing a water project in the area. 149 In the eyes of the
Forest Service, these claims made the area "more suitable for timber
harvesting than for wilderness use."' 5 ° To ameliorate the effect of the
timber sale on the primitive area, the Forest Service excluded portions of
the East Meadow Creek area from the final sale proposal to act as a
51
buffer zone.'
The district court defined the issue to be whether the Wilderness Act
required the Forest Service to review the East Meadow Creek area and
submit a recommendation regarding wilderness inclusion to the
President "and whether acts which would change its character should be
enjoined until the determination can be made."'1 52 The district court held
that the Wilderness Act itself required the Forest Service to maintain the
status quo in the area until such time as the President could recommend
to Congress whether to include the area in the National Wilderness
Preservation System or not. 153 The court of appeals affirmed this
154
decision and the injunction.
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals were persuaded by
the argument that the Wilderness Act only provided protection to
specific lands that were classified as primitive before its date of
enactment and that all these lands were subject only to the rules and

148. Id. at 27. The ultimate sale amount was 4.3 million board feet. See Parker v.
United States, 309 F. Supp. 593, 594 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971).
149. ROTH,supra note 16, at 27; see also Parker,309 F. Supp. at 595-96.
150. Parker,309 F. Supp. at 596.
151. Parker,448 F.2d at 796; see also ROTH, supra note 16, at 27.
152. Parker,309 F. Supp. at 597.
153. Id. at 598-99; see also id. at 601 ("We find that if the proposed sale and harvesting
of timber proceeds, it will frustrate the purpose of the Wilderness Act to vest the ultimate
decision as to wilderness classification in the President and Congress, rather than the
Forest Service and Secretary of Agriculture.").
154. Parker,448 F.2d at 798.
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regulations in force as of the date of enactment.15 5 Because the land in
East Meadow Creek was not part of a preexisting primitive area, it was
not subject to restrictions on primitive areas or any other limitations on
logging. Barring the Forest Service from logging in this area greatly
expanded the protection for unclassified lands possibly suitable for
inclusion within a wilderness area. Indeed, under the Parker ruling, any
action on any national forest lands posed a problem because those
actions could interfere with ultimate designation of the lands as
wilderness.' 5 6 Moreover, neither court addressed the fact that Congress
itself had specifically contemplated in the terms of the Wilderness Act
that the Gore Range-Eagle's Nest Primitive Area would shrink. To be
sure, the area of deletion that Congress envisioned was at the southern
tip of the area, and the East Meadow Creek lands were (despite the
name) to the west of the primitive area.157 But Congress had rightly or
wrongly decided that not all of the primitive area would be necessary to
make the National Wilderness Preservation System whole.
The district court and court of appeals could have reached a more
narrow decision based on the Forest Service's own manual, which
appeared to require the kind of preservation and study of contiguous
areas that the courts found in the terms of the Wilderness Act itself. 5 8
That basis for a holding would have reached the same result without the
potentially overbroad reasoning that removed discretion from the
agency. That basis would also have allowed the Forest Service to amend
its manual to change the result.'5 9 In any event, the decision in Parker
ultimately received the approval of Congress. When Congress

155. Parker, 309 F. Supp. at 599 n.3; see also Parker,448 F.2d at 796-97.
156. The federal government made the same point in its unsuccessful petition for
certiorari in the case. "The decision would require the Forest Service to make no use of
any forest lands having wilderness value contiguous to established primitive areas (an
amorphous concept at best that would be exceedingly difficult to apply) until the
President and Congress have acted with respect to those areas." Petition for Certiorari, No.
71-915, at 15, 405 U.S. 989 (filed Jan. 13, 1972).
157. Parker,309 F. Supp. at 603 (map depicting disputed lands).
158. See id. at 599-600 (discussing the Forest Service manual).
159. To be sure, it was and is unclear the extent to which the Forest Service Manual
is law that a court can enforce against the agency. Compare Forest Guardians v. Animal &
Plant Health Inspection Serv., 309 F.3d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2002); Western Radio Servs.,
Inc. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 901 (9th Cir. 1996); Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 443
F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 1971) (stating that the Forest Service Manual "does not rise to the
status of a regulation"), with United States v. Patzer, 15 F.3d 934, 939 (10th Cir. 1993)
(affirming a criminal conviction relying on the definition of "guiding" in the Forest
Service Manual). Nevertheless, the court of appeals could have enforced the provision of
the Manual against the Forest Service without creating the larger issues of discretion over
forest management.
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designated the Eagles Nest Wilderness Area, it included all of the East
Meadow Creek area within the boundaries of the wilderness. 6 °
2. Wilderness Society v. Mainella.

Cumberland Island lies in the southeastern corner of Georgia.
Cumberland Island, which contains "some of the last remaining
undeveloped land on the barrier islands along the Atlantic coast," ''
features both wilderness elements and important historic structures,
including an area formerly occupied by freed slaves.' 62 Visitors arrive to

Cumberland Island via boat and, after the wilderness designation, had to
traverse the area by foot. Because the docking area for ferries from the
mainland lies approximately fourteen miles south of the historic areas
(which themselves are outside of the northern boundary of the
wilderness), 163 only capable hikers could travel from the ferry dock to
the historic areas. Although another ferry service to take visitors to the
north end of the island was considered, it never materialized. Thus, to
facilitate visits to the non-wilderness parts of the island, the Park Service
decided to provide rides to visitors in Park Service motor vehicles "until
boat service could be established."' 164 The Park Service's use of motor
vehicles for its own purposes to administer the area probably would fit
within the statutory allowance for motorized uses "necessary to meet
minimum requirements for the administration of the area."' 165 The
160. ALLIN, supra note 74, at 155 (1982).
161. Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1088 (11th Cir. 2004).
162. Id. at 1088 n.3. The Park Service also lost a case arising from the conflict
between the historic preservation obligations imposed by the National Historic
Preservation Act and the Wilderness Act in a case involving Olympic National Park.
Olympic Park Assocs. v. Mainella, No. C04-5732FDB, 2005 WL 1871114 (W.D. Wash. Aug.
1, 2005) (holding reconstruction of historic cabins violative of the Wilderness Act).
163. For the Park Service's map of Cumberland Island showing the boundaries of
the wilderness and the relevant roads and historic sites, see http://www.nps.gov
/cuis/upload/IslandMap.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2009).
164. Wilderness Watch, 375 F.3d at 1080.
165. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (Westlaw 2009). Plaintiffs did not challenge the Park
Service's use of vehicles for its own administrative needs, even though many of those needs
related to the management of the historic areas. The Eleventh Circuit did hold that the
Wilderness Act, not the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA"), governed the areas
in question, and that "any obligation the agency has under the NHPA to preserve these
historical structures must be carried out so as to preserve the 'wilderness character' of the
area." Wilderness Watch, 375 F.3d at 1092 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b)). This language
could suggest that the use of motor vehicles to administer areas of the National Park
beyond the wilderness boundary were not "necessary to meet minimum requirements,"
and some courts have held that use of wilderness areas to support non-wilderness interests
can violate the Wilderness Act. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353
F.3d 1051, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (evaluating a fish stocking program); Sierra
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question then became whether the Park Service could allow visitors to
hitch a ride on Park Service vehicles, arguing that "permitting tourists to
'piggyback' along on Park Service personnel trips to these locations
would yield 'no net increase in impact,'-that is, the number of trips and
overall impact on the area would be no greater than if the Park Service
were simply meeting its statutory obligations."16' 6 To be sure, the Park
Service was not planning on simply picking up the wayward walker or
the straggling, overly-ambitious and tired visitor when otherwise out on
Park Service business. The Service had "acquired a fifteen-person van in
order to accommodate larger numbers of visitors" and had "establish[ed]
a regular schedule in order to accommodate the transportation of
visitors."

167

Relying on Chevron, the court of appeals reversed the district court
and held that the program violated the express terms of the Wilderness
Act.' 68 Given the fact that the Park Service dedicated agency resources
to accommodating the travel needs of visitors, the Eleventh Circuit
could have held simply that the planned use of motor vehicles exceeded
the minimum requirements necessary for administering the area: the
type of vehicles, passenger vans, and the established schedule of trips
were necessary for the visitors and not for wilderness administration.
69
Indeed, that argument formed part of the basis of the court's decision.'
Yet, the Eleventh Circuit's decision went beyond minimum
requirements analysis and held "that Congress has unambiguously
prohibited the Park Service from offering motorized transportation to
park visitors through the wilderness area."' 17 0 This language suggests that
any presence of non-Park Service personnel in a Park Service vehicle
would violate the Wilderness Act. In reaching that conclusion, the court
noted that the presence of the vans would impair the wilderness
experience "for visitors they happen[ed] to pass (more so than would be
the case upon meeting a lone park ranger in a jeep). 17 1 The vans would
also ruin the wilderness experience for the people in the vans. These
visitors probably did not want a complete wilderness experience. After
all, they were setting out to see the historic areas full of permanent
Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40, 42-43 (D.D.C. 1987) (concerning pine beetle eradication).
166. Wilderness Watch, 375 F.3d at 1089-90.
167. Id. at 1090.
168. See id. at 1091 (citing and discussing Chevron).
169. Id. at 1093.
170. Id. at 1094.
171. Id. at 1093. The court cited no authority indicating that, without the vans, a
lone park ranger in a jeep would be what wilderness visitors would typically encounter;
more likely, it would be one or more Park Service employees in a pickup truck.
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structures, but they were nevertheless going to have one if they wanted
to visit Cumberland Island.
At first blush, the provision of scheduled van service through a
wilderness area seems like an easy case of a violation of the Wilderness
Act. In reaching its result, however, the court set aside some of the Park
Service's legitimate concerns, some of which are mentioned in the
opinion and some of which are not. First, even though the Park Service
planned to use passenger vans that were unrelated to Park Service
management of the wilderness area, the overall nulber of motor vehicle
trips through the wilderness area would have remained unchanged. The
Park Service may have routinized and regularized its managementrelated motor vehicle usage to fit the schedule of arriving visitors, but
vehicles would not spend more time in the wilderness merely to carry
passengers. Thus, the overall impact on the wilderness experience for
the visitors seeking one would be unchanged. The court speculated that
there would be a difference to wilderness visitors between seeing a van
and seeing a jeep,172 but it had no evidence in the administrative
record-which forms the basis of judicial review-to support its
conclusion on that point. Second, the court made sure to point out that
the visitors on the vans would not have a wilderness experience-even
though it suggested that they probably did not want one. 173 By watching
out for those visitors in addition to the wilderness-oriented visitors, the
court imposed the wilderness ideal upon those who rejected it. Third, the
Park Service had many obligations incidental to its management of
Cumberland Island, and enhancing visitor opportunities for all of the
features of the island, including the important historical sites, is one that
deserves attention. The historical sites are of little use and impact
without human interaction. Finally, the Wilderness Act itself does not go
as far as the Eleventh Circuit did in holding that all motorized
transportation for visitors to Cumberland Island is prohibited. On its
face, the Wilderness Act would clearly allow the Park Service to use
motor vehicles to rescue an injured hiker, even one who entered the
wilderness area with every intention of roughing it. 174 Allowing a few
visitors to pile into the back of a pickup truck so that they will not miss
the return ferry would probably not have great impact on wilderness
values and might meet the minimum requirements standard. Making

172. Wilderness Watch, 375 F.3d at 1093.
173. Id. (noting that although "there is nothing wrong with appreciating natural
beauty from inside a passenger van ...[ilt
is simply not the type of 'use and enjoyment'
promoted by the Wilderness Act.").
174. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (Westlaw 2009).
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sure that visitors without proper gear are not stranded in a wilderness
area overnight would appear to be related to proper administration of the
area. Reading the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, however, one would not
conclude simply that the narrow issue of scheduled passenger van
service was the problem but that any provision of assistance was
prohibited.
Within six months, Congress responded to the Eleventh Circuit's
decision. In the Cumberland Island Wilderness Boundary Adjustment
Act of 2004,175 Congress redrew the boundary of the wilderness area to
exclude the roads over which the Park Service planned to provide motor
vehicle transportation.17 6 In addition, Congress directed the Park Service
to devise a "management plan to ensure that not more than 8 and not less
than 5 round trips are made available daily. .. [along the roads] ... by
the National Park Service or a concessionaire for the purpose of
transporting visitors to and from the historic sites located adjacent to
Wilderness." '7 The Park Service has detailed its plans to provide such
78

service. 1

179
3. Wilderness Society v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service.

The wilds of Alaska seem to provide endless natural bounties that
human activities simply cannot exhaust. One of these bountiful
resources is fish. Despite the seemingly limitless supply of fish, human
activities have strained fish stocks worldwide, including those in Alaska.
For decades, if not longer, humans have relied on fish-stocking activities
to preserve and enhance (and sometimes create) recreational and
commercial fisheries. Disputes over restocking fish populations within
wilderness areas have generated a considerable amount of controversy in
1 80
the scientific and policy literature.
175. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 145, 118 Stat.
2809, 3072-74 (2004) (amending the Cumberland Island Wilderness Boundary Adjustment
Act, Pub. L. No. 97-250, 96 Stat. 709 (1982)).
176. Id. § 2(b)(2), 118 Stat. at 3073.
177. Id. § 2(g).
178. See NAT'L PARK SERV., FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: NORTH END ACCESS
AND TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT PLAN, CUMBERLAND ISLAND SEASHORE (approved

May 1, 2009), available at http://www.nps.gov/cuis/parkmgmt/upload/FONSI%20%20Transportation%2OManagement%20Plan.PDF.
179. 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Professor Nagle discusses this case at
length. See Nagle, supra note 16, at 965-69.
180. See, e.g., Roland A. Knapp, Paul Stephen Corn & Daniel E. Schindler, The
Introduction of Nonnative Fish into Wilderness Lakes: Good Intentions, Conflicting Mandates, and
Unintended Consequences, 4 ECOSYSTEMS 275 (2001); Peter Landres, Shannon Meyer & Sue
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The historical attitude that federal agencies have adopted vis-A-vis

their counterparts in the state governments only complicates matters
surrounding fisheries management, fish stocking activities, and
regulation of commercial and sport fishing. Although courts have read
the Constitution to provide unchecked authority to the federal

government over fish and wildlife on federal lands, 8 ' federal agencies
frequently defer to the judgment of state fish and game agencies on these

matters. 182 For example, visitors who wish to hunt or fish on federal
lands usually must obtain the appropriate state license or tag.' 83 Federal
agencies sometimes defer to the states even up to the point of
erroneously denying the existence of federal power over activities
affecting fish and wildlife on federal lands. 84 The Wilderness Act itself
makes no statement regarding fish and wildlife within wilderness, except

for an express disclaimer of any effect of the act on state authority over
85
fish and wildlife in national forests.
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service manages the Kenai
National Wildlife Refuge, which includes the Kenai Wilderness Area, an
area added to the National Wilderness Preservation System by the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA). Lake
Tustumena lies within the wilderness area. It is the "fifth largest
freshwater lake in the State of Alaska."1 86 The fish-stocking program in
Lake Tustumena began as part of a project initiated by the state

Matthews, The Wilderness Act and Fish Stocking: An Overview of Legislation, Judicial
Interpretation,and Agency Implementation, 4 ECOSYSTEMS 287 (2001).
181. See, e.g.,
Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928); Wyoming v. United States,
279 F.3d 1214, 1227 (10th Cir. 2002).
182. See 36 C.F.R. § 241.1(a) (Westlaw 2009) (Forest Service policy of cooperation
with state fish and game counterparts).
183. See id. § 2.2(b)(4) (Westlaw 2009) (Park Service hunting regulations); id. § 2.3
(Park Service fishing regulation).
184. For example, in Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
environmentalists challenged a program run by the State of Alaska to cull wolves on
federally-owned public lands in the state. Initially, the Department of the Interior claimed
that it had not performed any environmental analysis on the program because it had no
power to stop it. Id. at 1241. Interior eventually agreed that it had such authority but,
because it did not exercise it, had not undertaken a federal action subject to NEPA, a
position that the courts agreed with. Id. at 1242 n.3.
185. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7) (Westlaw 2009) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed as affecting the jurisdiction or responsibilities of the several States with respect
to wildlife and fish in the national forests."). The fact that the act does not affect
'Jurisdiction or responsibilities" of the state does not answer the underlying questions of
how far thatjurisdiction extends and what those responsibilities are.
186. Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc).
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department of fish and game; 187 one purpose of stocking Lake
Tustumena was to support a commercial fishery outside- of the refuge
and wilderness area.' 88 The restocking program has existed since
1975.189 After discussions about continuing the enhancement effort, the
program was restructured to allow a private nonprofit entity, the Cook
Inlet Aquaculture Association (CIAA), to run the program.190 Under the
terms of the later-challenged permit the CIAA established a temporary
camp within the wilderness area, gathered eggs from salmon that were in
the wilderness area, brought them to a hatchery, reared them, and
released those young back into Lake Tustumena.191 A panel of the Ninth
Circuit, over Judge Betty Fletcher's dissent, agreed with the district
court and the agency that the permit governing the program comported
with the Wilderness Act. In particular, the panel relied on the fact that
the Wilderness Act itself calls for wilderness to be "protected and
managed."' 192 As noted by the panel,
A reasonable interpretation of this ambiguity is that a "wilderness"
does not exist in a vacuum. Human activities outside the wilderness
continue, with effects that most certainly are felt within the wilderness
area. While the wilderness must be "protected" so that its natural
processes dominate, it also must be "managed" so
93 that human
activities from outside the area do not interfere unduly. 1
The panel therefore concluded that the program could go forward.
Rehearing the case en banc, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the original
panel and reversed the agency's determination and the district court. The
en banc court determined that the program at issue was a "commercial
enterprise" barred by Section 4(c) of the Wilderness Act. 194 Because the
project ultimately supported a commercial fishery outside of the
95
wilderness area, the Wilderness Act's specific language barred it. 1
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the policies of the
Wilderness Act as well as the definition of wilderness as "'an area where

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. at 1056-57.
Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2003).
Wilderness Soc'y, 353 F.3d at 1057.
Id. at 1058.
16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (Westlaw 2009); see Wilderness Soc'y, 316 F.3d at 923-24.
316 F.3d at 924.
353 F.3d at 1061-62.
Id.
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the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man." ' 96 Using
that definition, the court decided that the activity, while not as
detrimental to wilderness as "building a McDonald's restaurant or a
Wal-Mart store,"' 9 7 nevertheless was a prohibited commercial enterprise
because its primary purpose was to aid commercial fishing outside of the
wilderness boundary. 98 Furthermore, the court referred to the seemingly
absolute ban on commercial enterprises within wilderness created in
Section 4(c) of the act without reference to the permission for some
commercial activities contemplated by Section 4(d)(5). The original
panel had at least relied on some evidence in the record that the
apparently "commercial" enterprise may in fact lead to improvements
within the bounds of the area,' 99 but the en banc court determined, under
both Chevron and under Mead, that Wilderness Act barred this
activity. 2°° The agency had also gone to great lengths to work within the
constraints of the Wilderness Act in permitting the program, including
using volunteers rather than paid employees, relying on a non-profit
rather than an obviously commercial enterprise, and eschewing the use
of motor vehicles or motorized equipment to support the program. The
Wilderness Act itself does not authorize the Fish and Wildlife Service to
regulate the activity that depletes the natural run of salmon (i.e.
commercial fishing outside of the wilderness area), so this program
constituted another approach to ameliorate the effects of that activity.
Without a fish-stocking program or reduced commercial fishing, the
ultimate result of the Ninth Circuit's decision may be to diminish this
run of salmon.
4. The countervailing evidence: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance.
The cases described above leave out two important data points: the
Supreme Court and the case law concerning, wilderness study areas.
These exclusions can be justified. After all, the Supreme Court has never
196. Id. at 1061 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)).
197. Id. at 1062.
198. Id. at 1064-65. The Wilderness Act itself does not direct courts to evaluate the
primary purpose of a project in order to determine whether they are commercial in nature
or not.
199. See Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 925 (9th Cir.
2003) (noting that reduction in salmon population caused by fishing outside of refuge
"endangers the viability of other species and the aquatic fertility of waters within the
Refuge") (emphasis in original).
200. 353 F.3d at 1059-60 (discussing appropriate level of deference due.to agency
action).
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interpreted the reach of, prohibitions in, or exceptions to the Wilderness
Act. Moreover, wilderness study areas are areas that are not wilderness
and perhaps do not qualify for the emotional and poetic attachment
received areas declared wilderness. Nevertheless, a Supreme Court
decision carries considerable weiglt, even if it does not directly govern
the legal dispute at issue.
The Supreme Court's main encounter with the overall program of
protecting wilderness arose in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance (SUWA).2 °1 In that case, environmentalists challenged the
decision of the BLM to permit off-road vehicles (ORVs) within a
wilderness study area. Under the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act, wilderness study areas are roadless areas of 5000 acres or more of
' 02
lands that the BLM manages that have "wilderness characteristics."
FLPMA requires that the BLM "manage such lands... in a manner so
as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as
wilderness. 20 3 According to the plaintiffs, the decision to allow ORVs
in some roadless areas violated the requirement that decisions "not...
impair" the wilderness potential of those lands. In that respect, the
litigation resembled the Parker case discussed above in that the suit
involved potential wilderness, rather than actual wilderness.
However, unlike the Parkerdecision, which rested its reasoning on
the language of the Wilderness Act, the decision in SUWA examined
whether the plaintiffs could use the judicial review provisions of the
APA to enforce the nonimpairment.standard of FLPMA. A unanimous
Supreme Court said "no." It held that the APA restricts review to "final
agency action, ' 20 4 and that this term included failures to act, such as the
failure to prevent impairment of a potential wilderness area, only when
the agency fails to undertake a specified agency action, such as a grant
of a license or of money.20 5 Because the violations alleged in SUWA
involved the failure of the BLM to undertake a discretionary activity,
and one about which it had a great deal of discretion to determine how to
meet its statutory obligation, review under the APA to require agency
action was not warranted.20 6
One can view SUWA broadly to demonstrate that courts are not tilted
toward wilderness protection. Nevertheless, several significant aspects
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

542 U.S. 55 (2004).
43 U.S.C. § 1782 (a) (Westlaw 2009).
Id. § 1782(c).
542 U.S. at 62 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704 (Westlaw 2009)).
Id. at 62-3.
Id. at 66-7.
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of the Court's decision distinguish this cases from the others analyzed
here. First, the case did not involve an area protected as wilderness by
Congress but an area for which the agency determined its status. A court
may afford more leeway to an agency in its administrative decisions
affecting an area that Congress has not expressly protected-although
the evidence on this point from the lower courts is mixed.2 °7 Second, the
SUWA decision comes from the Supreme Court. Scholars debate
whether the Supreme Court actually has an environmental jurisprudence,
as well as whether it should.20 8 On environmental issues generally, and
on wilderness issues specifically, the Supreme Court may be an outlier,
and one without a great deal of influence over more routine cases in the
lower courts.
5. Conclusion.
The point of examining these cases is not to suggest that the courts
erred or necessarily overstepped their boundaries. Rather, the point is to
support the contention that courts tend to review wilderness decisions
more strictly than other decisions. In the Parker case, Congress
ultimately included the area within the wilderness it designated, but it
could have done so after the timber sale simply by directing the Forest
Service to restore the area to wilderness conditions. Moreover, the
decision to include the area in question potentially impaired all timber
harvesting operations in all national forests. If that had occurred, that
result would have delighted environmental advocates, but, given the set
of compromises it put in the Wilderness Act, Congress probably did not
intend the wilderness study process to lead to a complete suspension of
commercial logging within the national forest system. In the
Cumberland Island case, Congress had previously contemplated some
kind of motorized accommodation for visitors on Cumberland Island but
had not reached a decision.20 9 Congressional adjustment of the boundary
and authorization to provide motorized vehicle services may represent
the best compromise, while still honoring the spirit of the Wilderness
Act, which preserves such decisions for Congress. 21 0 Finally, in the
207. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (regarding legal effect .of
Congress's release of lands from further study of wilderness potential).
208. Compare Richard J. Lazarus, Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of
Environmental Law, 24 VA. ENVTL. L. REV. 231 (2005); RichardJ. Lazarus, Restoring What's
EnvironmentalAbout Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703 (2000),
with Jay D. Wexler, The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 260
(2006).
209. Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004).
210. See 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (a) (Westlaw 2009) (providing that areas may be protected
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Kenai Peninsula case, the agency's attempts to conform its activity to
the constraints of the Wilderness Act-by relying on volunteers and
foregoing motor vehicles-did not persuade the court that the impact on
the wilderness area or on any visitor's wilderness experience would be
negligible at most. A reader interested in case analyses might wish to
know how the Supreme Court has resolved wilderness questions, since
the decisions of that court carry so much weight even outside of their
narrow settings. As the only Supreme Court decision touching on
wilderness areas, the Court's decision in SUWA might augur a future
decision repudiating the Parker, Cumberland Island, and Kenai
Peninsula cases. Because it involved multiple-use lands, however, the
Supreme Court's decision in SUWA does not undermine the conclusion
that, when it comes to areas to which Congress has granted the statutory
protection of "wilderness," the courts will act strongly to protect those
areas and maintain their purity.
B. Numerical Evidence
In addition to the evidence from the language of individual opinions,
a study of the outcome of all cases involving wilderness supports the
claim that courts reviewing agency decisions regarding areas protected
by the Wilderness Act tend to use a one-way ratchet in favor of
wilderness protection. This information shows that wilderness advocates
tend to win their lawsuits challenging the land management agencies'
decisions as being insufficiently protective of wilderness values; the
land management agencies almost never lose in challenges by other
wilderness users seeking to establish greater use of those areas. Even
though the overall win rate for the land management agencies is
consistent with statistics about the overall success of administrative
challenges in the courts, the results in this area skew heavily toward
protecting wilderness. While the more advanced statistical approaches
used in other empirical analyses of administrative review cases are not
employed here, the raw numbers alone provide telling evidence of the
phenomenon.
To establish these numbers, a search was conducted on Lexis and

as wilderness only by act of Congress); id. § 1132(b) (preserving final authority for
wilderness designation to Congress); see also H.R. REP. No. 88-1538, reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3615, 3616-17 (observing that statutory protection of wilderness would
"assure that no future administrator could arbitrarily or capriciously either abolish
wilderness areas that should be retained" and "[fulfill] [Congress's] . . . responsibility
under the U.S. Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the public lands" "by establishing
explicit legislative authority for wilderness preservation.").
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Westlaw using the search term "wilderness act." This search retrieved
all cases referencing or involving the Wilderness Act or subsequent
wilderness acts with the term "wilderness act" in their name.2 11 Many of
these cases involved only references to other decisions involving the
Wilderness Act or only made passing references to the Act. For
example, some cases involve roadless areas that are set aside for
possible future inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System
and thus protection under the Wilderness Act. In addition, in many cases
several reported decisions for the same case appeared in the search, and
some cases retrieved involved decisions ultimately reversed on other
grounds. These latter decisions were culled to eliminate decisions of no
continuing impact.2 12 After this refinement, ninety-four cases remained
and analysis of those principal cases showed striking results.
The ninety-four cases can be divided into two groups. In the first are
cases in which the challenge was brought by an environmental
organization seeking greater protection for or fewer uses within a
wilderness area. The three court of appeals cases discussed above
(Parker,the Cumberland Island case, and the Kenai Peninsula case) all
fall into this category, which contains fifty decisions. The second group
consists of all cases in which a plaintiff sought more uses within a
wilderness area or more protection for private rights within a wilderness
211. This information is on file with the author, and the search is current as of
January 1, 2010. Because the search term employed was "wilderness act," there may be
cases interpreting the wilderness provisions of the Eastern Wilderness Areas Act or
ANILCA that may have been overlooked in the survey. A preliminary evaluation of that
possibility reveals few if any such cases.
212. The ninety-four principal cases were determined by narrowing the overall group
of cases mentioning the term "wilderness act" as follows. First, all cases using the term
"wilderness act" but which do not involve an interpretation of the Act were eliminated
from further analysis. Second, only one controlling opinion from each litigation event was
counted unless the subsequent opinion involved a new issue for decision. Thus, the district
court's decision in Parker v. United States, discussed supra, and the court of appeals' decision
were treated as one decision. The panel's decision in the Kenai Peninsula case is not
counted as a principal case because it was reversed by the Ninth Circuit en banc. However,
a district court decision in the Cumberland Island case (one not discussed in the text
above) is counted separately from the Eleventh Circuit's opinion because it involved the
plaintiffs' application for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d) (Westlaw 2009) (EAJA). EAJA directs a court to award attorneys' fees to parties
that prevail against the United States "unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified." Id. § 2412(d) (1) (A). EAJA cases allow a court a
second chance to evaluate the soundness of the agency's decision and therefore provide
another measure for showing judicial deference to an administrative determination. This
method of distilling cases controls for double-counting and takes into account that some
involve decisions reversed on appeal. It narrows the inquiry to cases that matter most.
Subsequent empirical analysis of all decisions, not only the principal cases, will examine
trends and other elements of the decisions.
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area. Examples would include greater use rights within wilderness 213
access rights to private lands within wilderness,2 14 takings claims based
on wilderness regulation, 2 15 and tort claims arising from activities within
wilderness or how wilderness management decisions affected lands
216
outside of wilderness.
TABLE

1

More protection
sought
(Group 1)
Less protection
sought (Group
2)
Totals (for case
numbers only)

Agency Wins
24
(48%)
(Group lA)
38
(86.4%)
(Group 2A)
62
(66%)

Agency Loses
26
(52%)
(Group 1B)
6
(13.6%)
(Group 2B)
32
(34%)

Totals
50

44

94

The summary results (see Table 1) reveal a stark divide in the two
groups of cases. First, agencies prevail in only 48% of the cases in
Group 1, but they prevail at the extraordinary rate of 86.4% in the Group
2 cases, a gap strongly suggesting statistical significance.
A difficulty in determining the significance of these findings is
identifying an appropriate set of cases against which to compare cases
involving the Wilderness Act. Several legal scholars have tried to
measure numerically how administrative agencies fare in judicial review
of their actions. This scholarship tries to provide empirical evidence
about the interface between agencies and the courts to test assumptions
about. particular models of administrative action and the courts. Because
scholars hypothesize that agencies should win a majority, or indeed a
vast majority, of their cases in court simply based on the enunciated
rules of deference that courts are supposed to apply in reviewing
many scholars have examined
administrative determinations,
administrative review cases and determined how often and why agencies

213. E.g., Isle Royale Boaters Ass'n v. Norton, 330 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 2003)
(concerning motorboats); United States v. Gotchnik, 222 F.3d 506 (8th Cir. 2000)
(concerning motorized access to treaty-protected fishing rights); Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d
1522 (9th Cir. 1994) (concerning motorized access to mining claims).
214. E.g., Nelson v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
215. E.g., Pete v. United States, 531 F.2d 1018 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
216. E.g., Zumwalt v. United States, 928 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1991); McDaniel v.
United States, 899 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Tex. 1995), af'd, 102 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 1996).
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won their cases before the courts. 2 17 For purposes of this Article, the

simplest, baseline inquiry-how often agencies prevail in their court
litigation-forms an important benchmark number against which court
review of agency actions managing wilderness can be evaluated.
Peter Schuck and E. Donald Elliot's 1990 empirical study of judicial
review in the courts of appeals suggests that the level of deference

steadily increased from the 1960s (approximately 55% rate of affirming
the administrative agency's decision) to the 1980s (approximately 77%
affirmance rate).218 In a review of all cases involving Chevron from the

courts of appeals in 1995 and 1996, Orin Kerr found an overall
affirmance rate of 73% .2 19 A more recent study of agency success under
the less deferential standards of Mead and Skidmore found an overall

success rate of just over 60%.220
Empirical studies examining judicial decision-making

in the

environmental context have largely focused on determining whether the

political preferences of judges play a determinative role in outcomes.
Richard Revesz's analysis focused exclusively on decision-making in
the District of Columbia Circuit in the context of challenges to EPA
rulemakings. 22 ' Although Revesz did not provide a condensed rate of
affirmances in this particular context, he concluded that political
ideology is a statistically significant determinant of voting patterns,
especially when: 1) more than one judge from a particular political party
is on the panel; and 2) the issue is procedural (and therefore, by
hypothesis, less likely to generate further review).22 2 He acknowledges

that his sample might not represent a fair cross-sampling of all judicial
decisions because of the unique nature of the D.C. Circuit (e.g. the more
intensive political aspect of the appointment process and the exclusive

217. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 2; Schuck & Elliott, supra note 2. These analysesfocus
on the effect of the Court's decision in Chevron. Because the Court's decision in Mead is
fairly recent, empirical analyses studying judicial review of agency actions focus primarily
on the effect of Chevron in particular cases.
218. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 2, at 1009. Their study was at odds with the statistics
from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which found a relatively stable
affirmance rate of 70% to 76%. Id. at 1010. Schuck & Elliott attribute the disparity to
differences in the methods that they and the Administrative Office used to assemble the
respective data sets, and there is no reason to question that assertion for purposes of this
Article. Id. at 1009.
219. Kerr, supra note 2, at 31.
220. Kristen E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard,107 COLUM. L. REv. 1235, 1275 (2007).
221. Revesz, supra note 2, at 1717.
222. Id. at 1719 (providing summary conclusions). A more detailed breakdown of
reversal votes can be found at 1739 tbl. 2.
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review provisions of environmental statutes that concentrate power in
that court).22 3 Subsequently, Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein examined
cases from all the courts of appeals in two areas of political controversy,
environmental cases and labor disputes, and found support for the
argument that political ideology, along with panel composition, affected
rates of affirmance (or validation) of the agency's position.2 24 Although
their study showed statistically significant evidence that political
ideology and panel composition affected these rates, the overall
affirmance rate that they reported ranged between 51% (Democratic
appointee reviewing a "not liberal" agency decision) and 70%
(Republican appointee reviewing same).22 5 The legal rules requiring
deference to administrative agencies were thought "to reduce, even
226
minimize, divisions between Republican and Democratic appointees."
A recent article by Jason Czarnezki expands on these findings with a
detailed analysis of cases decided between 2003 and 2005 'in the federal
courts of appeals.2 27
Because not all agency decisions involving the Wilderness Act are
reviewed under Chevron, other studies of judicial review in the
environmental context bear on this study. Christopher Schroeder and
Robert Glicksman examined EPA's success rates in the courts of appeals
under both the Chevron doctrine and other doctrines of deference.22 8
Overall, they found that EPA prevailed 60 to 67% of the time in their
period of study. Empirical analyses of cases involving the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) offer another baseline for
comparison with the data on wilderness challenges. These studies have
the added comparative virtue of containing cases from both the courts of
appeals and the district courts, much like the Wilderness Act cases. In
one study, the authors found that courts uphold agency NEPA analyses
in 55% of reported district court cases between 1970 and 1984, and 65%
of court of appeals cases in the same time period.2 29 These success rates
varied over time, and during one year agencies prevailed at the
extremely lowrate of 18.85% of their district court cases and 5% of their
223. Id. at 1720-21.
224. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 823.
225. Id. at 849.
226. Id. at 852 n.36.
227. Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking Statutory
Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767
(2008).
228. Christopher M. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, and
EPA in the Courts ofAppeals Duringthe 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 371 (2001).
229. Kent & Pendergrass, supra note 3, at 13.
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cases in the courts of appeals. 230 Some significant variation occurred
between the types of NEPA challenges brought forward and also the
agency making the determination. 2 3' More recent data indicate that the
overall success rate for plaintiffs initiating challenges to agency actions
under NEPA has stayed relatively constant, but that the success rate
varies considerably depending upon the political ideology of the makeup
of appellate panels.23 2 A crucial difference between NEPA cases and
Wilderness Act cases, however, is that the former almost always involve
challenges by environmentally-oriented plaintiffs. Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit-a key court for understanding environmental litigation simply
because of its geographical. scope-allows NEPA challenges only by
plaintiffs who assert environmental concerns about a particular action,
excluding those who wish to use NEPA as a stalking 33horse for other
2
concerns such as economic effects of a proposed action.
Political scientists have also attempted to measure the success rates
for environmental interest groups. An early study showed that
agencies did better than either industry or
"[g]overnment
environmentalists in those cases in which they were involved, ' '234 with a
success rate of over 50%. Subsequent studies have confirmed this
general view.
Whatever one selects as the appropriate comparative set of cases to
examine, the Wilderness Act cases stand in stark contrast to them. What
is especially noteworthy in the Wilderness Act cases is the stark divide
between the agency affirmance rates depending on the type of challenge
brought, that is, the wide gap between the success rates for challenges
brought by environmental organizations and challenges brought by those
asserting activity rights within wilderness. That gap is quite different
from that found in the reported data from other studies.23 5
Table 2 reorganizes the same information about cases to illustrate
the point on judicial review. Cases in which a court has voted "for"
additional wilderness protection are those in which more protection is

230. Id. at 13 n.20 (noting figures for 1981).
231. Id. at 15.
232. Jay E. Austin et al., ENvrL. L. INST.,JUDGING NEPA: A "HARD LOOK" ATJUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 8-10 (2004).

233. See, e.g., Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir.
2005) (citing cases).
234. Lettie McSpadden Wenner, Interest Group Litigation and EnvironmentalPolicy, 11
POL. STUD.J. 671, 677 (1983).
235. See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 849 (reporting gaps in voting patterns
between liberal and conservative judges in environmental cases); Revesz, supra note 2, at
1738 (reporting gaps in voting patterns between liberal and conservative judges).
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sought and the agency loses, and those in which less protection is sought
and the agency wins. These parameters correspond to Groups 1B plus
2A. .Similarly, courts vote "against" additional wilderness protection
with the opposite voting patterns (affirming less protection sought or

rejecting claims for additional protection, reflected in Group IA + 2B).
Combining the cases this way yields the distribution in Table 2.
TABLE'2

"Pro-wilderness"

More
protection

Less
protection

sought

sought

26

38

outcome

Totals
64
(68.1%)

"Anti24
wilderness"
outcome
Totals (for case 50

6

30
(31.9%)

44

90

numbers only)
Using this same organizational scheme and arraying the data in
terms of the political affiliation of the judges' votes shows that the vote
distribution remains relatively unchanged depending on whether the
judges making the decision were appointed by Democratic or
Republican presidents.2 36 (See Tables 3 and 4.)
236. There are several significant difficulties in using the party of a judge's
appointment as a proxy for that judge's politics or ideology. Presidents often provide
senators with a voice on judicial appointments and appoint candidates for reasons other
than ideology (such as diversity). Some judges receive nominations from one party and are
subsequently re-nominated by a president of a different party. Nevertheless, other scholars
have used the party of appointment method in prior studies..See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein,
supra note 2, at 848 n.33; Revesz, supra note 2, at 1718 n.6. These numbers are therefore
provided to incorporate the considerations of political influence that have received
attention in other studies. Even relying on the party of appointment proxy, further analysis
will be necessary to determine more conclusively whether political affiliation has an
influence on judicial voting patterns in the wilderness context.
To count votes, each separate vote of a court of appeals judge was determined and
coded by party affiliation. For example, in the Sixth Circuit's en banc decision in StupakThrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996), the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's decision-one upholding a private landowner's challenge to boating and
other use regulations within wilderness-by an equally divided decision without opinion.
Only seven judges expressed their reasoning in an opinion. Three judges (Moore, Merritt
and Daughtrey, all Democratic appointees), expressly voted to affirm the district court's
decision; four judges (Boggs, Norris, Suhrheinrich, and Batchelder) expressly voted to
reverse. Id. at 1269. Because the decision affirmed the agency's regulation, it counted as a
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(Votes by Democratic appointees)
More
Less
protection
protection
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TABLE

sought

sought

"Pro32
wilderness"
outcome
"Anti24
wilderness"
outcome
Totals
(for 56
case numbers
only)

I

Totals

28

60
(69.8%)

2

26
(30.2%)

30

86

I

I

_I

TABLE 4

(Votes by Republican appointees)
More
Less
protection
protection
sought
sought
"Pro22
36
wilderness"

Totals
58
(64.4%)

outcome

"Antiwilderness"

22

10

32
(35.6%)

Totals
(for 44
case numbers

46

90

outcome

only)

Although there is a difference between the number of cases in each
group--a variation that is explained by random distribution of cases

win for the agency. The three recorded votes to affirm were included in the "prowilderness"/less protection sought category and the four recorded dissenting votes were
included in the "anti-wilderness"/less protection sought category for these purposes.
For district court cases, each district court judge vote was counted separately. Because
magistrate judges are appointed by the local judiciary and therefore may not reflect party
politics as much asjudges who are vetted by politicians, votes of magistrate judges were not
counted either way. Some magistrate judge decisions were included as principal cases,
however.
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among the panels and judges-the initial review reveals little to no
difference between the overall voting patterns of Democratic judges
versus Republican judges, at least as measured on the prowilderness/anti-wilderness vote percentages.
Three important points emerge .from these data. First, as described
earlier, a one-way ratchet appears to exist in favor of wilderness
protection within the judiciary. Second, this one-way ratchet appears to
operate regardless of party of appointment of the judge. Third, the first
and second observations make Wilderness Act case law an excellent
instance against which to measure other assumptions about judicial
review in administrative law. We now turn to explanations of why the
case law may be directed in this way.
IV. WHY ARE COURTS ACTING THIS WAY?
The foregoing evidence suggests that, in the context of protecting
wilderness areas, courts are not acting as much like courts as one would
predict from the doctrines of deference that apply in these cases. An
implication of this suggestion is that, in this context, judges behave more
like policy makers than neutral arbiters. This implication will
undoubtedly meet much resistance. Because the anecdotal and empirical
evidence presented cannot conclusively support the argument just
advanced, however, a review of other possible explanations are in order.
Further research will provide additional support for or refutation of these
hypotheses. This section will describe the questions on which additional
research will be helpful.
A. The Wilderness Act Invites Strict JudicialConstruction
One could argue that the language of the Wilderness Act itself
invites judges to tilt towards wilderness protection. After all, the Act
defines wilderness as "an area where the earth and its community of life
are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not
remain."2 37 That statement does not appear in a general declaration of
congressional policy, which courts have held are not determinative in
reviews of agency action;2 38 rather, it forms part of the definition of the

237. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (Wesdaw 2009).
238. See, e.g., In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d 1175, 1188 (1lth Cir. 2008) ("We interpret and
apply statutes, not congressional purposes"); Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156,
178 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is one thing for Congress to announce a grand goal, and quite
another for it to mandate full implementation of that goal.).
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term "wilderness area" itself.23 9 Thus, a reviewing court could read this
definition and decide that Congress has created a legal term of art that
informs basic disputes involving wilderness. The invocation of this
language in several decisions even where the language is not itself at
issue would support this argument.24 °
Nevertheless, the decisions analyzed here do not directly involve the
definition of "wilderness" in Section 2(c) of the Wilderness Act; instead,
most involve interpretations of the specific terms of Sections 4(c) and
4(d) of the Act. The "untrammeled" language of Section 2(c) may
inform the judges' views, but the management agencies are faced with
more precise questions of interpretation, such as what constitutes
"mechanical transport," what regulations are "necessary" for
management of access, and, perhaps most important, what measures are
"minimum requirements" for management of the area. Although the
general terms of the Wilderness Act may inform these determinations,
the more specific terms, under normal rules of judicial construction of a
statute and review of agency interpretations of that statute, should
govern over the more general language of the statute.2 41
B. Wilderness ProtectionHas Long-Standing and Widespread Political
Support
As noted several times, all presidents since Lyndon Johnson-both
Democrats and Republicans-have approved legislation adding lands to
the National Wilderness Preservation System. Judicial action approving
additional wilderness protection would likely not produce resistance
from Congress. Although Congress has, on occasion, overridden judicial
decisions through specific legislation-as proved true in the Cumberland
Island litigation-Congress usually accepts judicial decision-making for
wilderness.
This political support for wilderness can stem from many factors.
The public appears to embrace romantic visions of wilderness as
expressed by Thoreau and Marshall; Zahniser's language in the
Wilderness Act resonates with many Americans. Moreover, the public
may see wilderness protection as not costing them anything once a
wilderness area is established. Wilderness areas often have few natural
239. For more on the exact definition in Section 2(c) of the Act, see Scott, supra note
16, at 74.
240. See supra note 137.
241. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007)
("normally the specific governs the general"); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504
U.S. 374, 384-385 (1992); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978).
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resources beside their physical beauty, an amenity whose worth depends
on preservation. For even a cynical politician, support for wilderness
preservation may provide useful cover for other actions that are inimical
to the environment.24 2
Nevertheless, federal judges normally do not sit to make politically
popular decisions. Many decisions-even those involving the
interpretation of statutes-receive harsh criticism and go against public
sentiment.2 43 Indeed, life tenure for judges famously insulates them from
the political process. Thus, it would be unusual for judges to tilt in favor
of wilderness simply because the outcome would be politically or
publicly popular.
C. Judges Are Risk-Averse in Deciding Wilderness Cases
Judicial opinions may also tilt in favor of wilderness protection
because of the nature of decisions about wilderness. If a judge decides in
favor of an extractive interest or a private right within wilderness, it
becomes difficult to take that decision back or reverse its potential
effects quickly. Moreover, those who seek to enjoy motorized recreation
on public lands or to extract resources from them have millions of other
acres on which they can conduct their activities. If, however, a judge
upholds an environmental challenge to activities within wilderness, no
palpable damage will occur to the land itself.24 4 In addition, groups
seeking permission to conduct their activities can always seek the

242. Former President Bush's recent designation, under the provisions of the
Antiquities Act, of three marine areas as national monuments may support this
observation. See Proclamation No. 8335, 74 Fed. Reg. 1557 (Jan. 12, 2009); Proclamation
No. 8336, 74 Fed. Reg. 1565 (Jan. 12, 2009); Proclamation No. 8337, 74 Fed. Reg. 1577
(Jan. 12, 2009). Most commentators do not regard President Bush to be an aggressive
protector of the environment, yet most approve of this action. Allison Winter, OCEANS:
Enviro Groups Praise Bush's 'Blue Legacy', GREENWIRE, Jan. 6, 2009; Editorial, Mr. Bush's
Monument, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, at A26.
243. A recent example may be the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). The decision elicited public opposition, and the
reaction eventually culminated in the enactment of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). This example is offered not to take a position
on whether the Supreme Court misinterpreted the statutory provisions at issue but only to
show that public opinion did not sway the Court's decision in that case (assuming that the
public reaction reflected public opinion prior to the Court's decision).
244. Some perceptible harm may occur to individuals seeking to establish rights of
use within wilderness, and it may be for that reason that courts have sometimes sided with
those plaintiffs. See, e.g., Nelson v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (N.D. Ga. 1999)
(allowing access to private residential lands); Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055
(W.D. Mich. 1997) (allowing a private landowner to use a motorboat within a wilderness
despite general ban).
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permission of Congress (as ultimately happened in the Cumberland
Island case). In sum, judges may utilize an unspoken, weak version of
the precautionary principle in wilderness cases.
The explanatory power of this theory is undercut by two pieces of
countervailing evidence. First, environmental challenges do not prevail
at an overwhelming rate. This theory may explain why judges reject
"anti-wilderness"
challenges to management
decisions more
persuasively than why they support environmental challenges. Second,
and perhaps more important, judges do not employ such a preference for
risk-aversion when reviewing cases involving much more tangible harm
to human beings and their environment, such as review of hazardous
waste or air pollution regulations. Indeed, some judges apparently favor
industry challenges to environmental regulations, thus often agreeing
with arguments that the government is protecting the environment too
stringently.24 5 In other words, the effect appears to exist primarily in the
special subset of wilderness cases, not in environmental law generally.
This effect may stem from the fact that wilderness protection does not
usually have an obvious countervailing cost of the regulation (as would
246
a restriction on the use of a particular product).
D. Wilderness Advocacy OrganizationsHave Excellent Attorneys
Another explanation for the success rate of wilderness advocates
could be that they have better attorneys than the usual plaintiff who
challenges an agency decision. There is strong evidence in the literature
that better lawyering (as defined by representation by large firms or
committed advocacy groups) often leads to more success for those
positions. 2 4 Further analysis of the case data will provide better
evidence of the strength of this claim.
Some initial problems in study design present themselves. First, the
quality of representation would have to be analyzed with respect to
similar statutes, such as the National Environmental Policy Act or the
Endangered Species Act, to determine whether the wilderness cases
245. See Revesz, supra note 2, at 1738.
246. For example, in Corrosion Proof Fittings, Inc. v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.
1991), the court of appeals rejected EPA's attempt to ban asbestos-a known carcinogen
and health hazard-from most consumer goods, in part because EPA relied on
unquantifiable benefits from the regulation in its statutorily required cost-benefit analysis.
Id. at 1219.
247. See, e.g., Timothy R. Johnson, et al., Oral Advocacy Before the United States Supreme
Court:Does it Affect theJustices'Decisions?,85 WASH. U. L. REv. 457 (2007);Joseph D. Kearney
& Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L.
REv. 743 (2000).

HeinOnline -- 29 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 122 2010

20101

WILDERNESS AD THE COURTS

stand apart. If the bar advocating wilderness protection is as able as the
rest of the environmental advocacy bar-a matter that may be quite
difficult to measure or determine-then the wilderness cases would
stand apart. Second, finding appropriate proxies for lawyer quality in
this context may be difficult. Wilderness advocates may be repeat
players familiar with the intricacies of the Wilderness Act and
wilderness regulation, especially as compared with attorneys
representing private interests in wilderness.24 8 But the quality of the
lawyers representing the agencies' positions likely is fairly consistent
and it would be unlikely that the government agencies have lawyers that
are much better than private interest advocates or much worse than
environmental advocates. Thus, this hypothesis is unlikely to explain the
disparity between the success rates in the two groups of cases. Indeed,
the agency lawyers are the real repeat players, since they face both types
of challenges.
E. The Court Decisions Correct Biased Decisions by the Land
Management Agencies
There is historical evidence that land management agencies have
resisted wilderness designations. 249 They may have a systematic bias
against furthering wilderness protection and systematic preferences for
other uses, such as fish and wildlife programs supported by state
agencies. Overall support for the wilderness suggests that the courts may
perceive this bias and work to correct it. However, determining whether
a particular decision stems from bias against wilderness support, for a
state agency, or some other source would be difficult to determine based
on the case law alone. However, empirical research shows that some
agencies tend to fare better in court than others, 25 0 so one would have to
examine the extent to which one agency may bear the responsibility for
skewing the overall win/loss record. Moreover, although the four
agencies quite possibly have different cultures about their amenability to
wilderness protection, determining agency bias toward or against
wilderness protection would be difficult. An obvious example is the case
of the Forest Service, which has the longest history of wilderness

248. A classic theoretical treatment of the ability of repeat players to succeed in
litigation is Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974). Empirical research has since provided
support for Galanter's argument. See IN LITIGATION, DO THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT

AHEAD? (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Sibley eds., 2003).
249. See ScoTt, supra note 16, at 66-73.
250. See, e.g., Schuck & Elliott, supra note 2, at 1021-22.
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protection but also, perhaps, the most long-standing objection to
legislative rather than administrative protection of wilderness. Further
empirical research may be necessary to determine the extent to which
one agency may bear the responsibility for skewing the overall winloss
record. Designing the study would pose conceptual difficulties beyond
the perceived or hypothesized views of the agencies. The Forest Service
manages the most wilderness areas by number, while the National Park
Service oversees the most wilderness areas as measured by acreage,2 5'
giving rise to questions of which measure more accurately reflects an
agency's impact on overall results. Moreover, the other two agencies,
the FWS and the BLM, could make a decision about wilderness that, if
adjudicated to be erroneous by the courts, could have a significant
impact on wilderness management beyond the bounds of those particular
agencies. 25 2 In addition, the frequency of litigation concerning particular
wilderness areas would have to be taken into account.2 53
F. Judicial Preferencefor Wilderness ProtectionReflects Broader
PopularSupportfor the Same
It almost goes without saying that federal judges are also people
with the same likes and dislikes of other members of the public; they
enjoy Project Runway or not; go to the beach during the summer, or to
the mountains, or neither; enjoy college football or not. What
distinguishes federal judges from most people is the fact that, after
confirmation by the Senate, they have a commission from the President
to serve as a federal judge. This observation does not diminish the
responsibilities of their appointment, nor do I wish to suggest that
federal judges do not take those responsibilities seriously. But judges do
not cease to be people with many of the same cultural biases and
prejudices as others. If my assumption is correct-and an attitudinal
survey of federal judges would be necessary to overcome the drawbacks
of anecdotal evidence-then one can expect that federal judges would

251. See Wilderness Fast Facts, http://www.wilderness.net/index.cfm?fuse=NWPS
&sec=fastFacts (last visited Dec. 11, 2009).
252. For example, in the Kenai Peninsula fish restocking case, the wilderness area at
issue is managed by the FWS. As suggested supra notes 179-199 and accompanying text,
that decision raises potential issues for wilderness restoration efforts in all wilderness areas
in the Ninth Circuit, not just the Kenai Wilderness.
253. The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness has been the single wilderness
area most subject to litigation, which may reflect its age and the organizational skills of the
advocacy groups seeking to protect it. On these efforts, see Richard A. Duncan & Kevin
Proescholdt, Protecting the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness: Litigation and Legislation,
76 DENY. U. L. REV.621 (1999).
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have a tilt that favors wilderness protection. This tilt would mirror the
public opinion polls on wilderness. 254
If the anecdotal and empirical analysis discussed above correctly
describes how courts act in wilderness cases and the theoretical
explanation provides the reason behind the judicial preference for less
development in wilderness, a question of whether this phenomenon hurts
wilderness protection remains. In other words, if the courts are less
deferential to the land management agencies, might that not be a good
thing? Most wilderness advocates believe that the land management
agencies will cut corners where possible when it comes to wilderness
protection. A one-way bias in favor of wilderness protection would thus
strike them as a desirable counterbalance to the agencies' desire to
manage their lands with as much discretion as possible.
V. DOES A ONE-WAY RATCHET FOR WILDERNESS PROTECTION ALWAYS
PROTECT ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS?

As noted above, some of the land management agencies have, in the
past, had overall a neutral or even a somewhat hostile view of
wilderness. Wilderness designation limits the discretion of the agency to
manage its lands as it sees fit, and one could hypothesize that the agency
decisions might tilt against the strictest control of activities within
wilderness. Making decisions to protect wilderness might prove
controversial in the relationship with state governments or with political
officials within the agency's department. The work of the Arthur Carhart
National Wilderness Training Center has undoubtedly contributed
greatly to unifying the various agencies' visions of wilderness, and
wilderness advocates recognize that the work of this center has
improved wilderness stewardship values within the- land management
agencies. 255 Nevertheless, advocates still see problems with wilderness
decisions and have legitimate complaints with some of them.
Some cases are closer, however. The project for Tustumena Lake in
the Kenai Peninsula provides a telling example of how the agencies have
tried to make wilderness management work within the confines of the
Wilderness Act. In that case, the agency tried to balance a long-standing
environmental restoration program-albeit one driven by environmental
pressures caused by commercial human impacts outside of the
wilderness area-against the demands of the Wilderness Act itself.
Although the nonprofit organization actually administering the program
254. See supra note 114 (citing public opinion polling data).
255. See SCOTr, supra note 16, at 131.
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may have existed solely to run this program on behalf of commercial
interests, it was still a not-for-profit and therefore, by some definitions,
noncommercial. Ecological restoration within wilderness may be a key
use of those areas, 256 and the commercial potential of recovered and
restored species may lend additional support for federal actions to
enhance these populations.2 57
Future decisions that embody the view I ascribe to the courts may, in
the end, hinder wilderness protection in ways not foreseen or desired by
the advocates for wilderness who have produced this body of case law. I
will offer two examples, one hypothetical and one real. The hypothetical
example involves conflicts of uses within wilderness that pit
environmental advocates against themselves or against other groups with
whom they may share overall political goals. For the hypothetical
example, take the question of wheelchairs within a newly-established
wilderness. As described above, this issue poses a knotty problem for
wilderness managers. Many areas now added to the National Wilderness
Preservation System already include marks of human habitation and
other impacts, including in some cases small sections of paved or, if
unpaved, well-worn roads. The transformation required to restore these
areas to a state of roadlessness and thus foster wilderness values might
involve the one-time use of motorized equipment. Such a use might
involve a jackhammer to break up the surface, a backhoe to remove any
paving material, and a truck to haul that material away. Wilderness
advocates might tolerate-or indeed encourage-such an intrusion of
motorized equipment in the short term for the overall benefits of
restoring the area to wilderness. Of course, the land management agency
could carry out the work without motorized equipment, using picks and
shovels to break up the roadway and collect any pieces and load it up on
pack animals to haul away the debris. This non-motorized and nonmechanized means of road removal would probably take longer, involve
more agency personnel, meet with more resistance from those
employees tasked with working by hand, and could very well cost more
money. Whether using motorized equipment under these circumstances
presents a question of whether the approach with power equipment
comports with a "minimum requirements" analysis2 58 is not important

256. See, e.g., BOTKIN, supra note 123, at 194-201; see also Rohlf & Honnold, supra note
125, at 271-73.
257. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000) (relying on the
commercial potential of the red wolf to support the constitutionality of regulations
protecting the species).
258. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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here. One could also imagine advocates who favor increased access for
the disabled taking the view that the agency can proceed only with the
non-mechanized alternative. Their ultimate goal might be to slow down
the destruction of the roadway so that there would be an easier route for
people in wheelchairs to explore the wilderness area more deeply and
easily than other means might allow. Delay can often result in a victory
of sorts. Advocates for the disabled would likely cite the cases
concerning motorized uses in wilderness, such as the Cumberland Island
case, that the wilderness advocates worked to win.
Of course, if such a case arose, Congress could always address these
questions either in comprehensive legislation or, in the case of
wilderness restoration, in the legislation creating the wilderness area.
Assuming that Congress did not do so, however, the agency would face
the difficult question of balancing the interest in wilderness restoration
against the compromise of using motorized equipment, factoring in the
relevance of access for the disabled. The Wilderness Act does not dictate
a clear result in such a case. Agencies can employ motorized equipment
to meet the minimum requirements necessary for the area. The
Americans with Disabilities Act provides that some wheelchairs are
allowed in wilderness areas but that agencies need not make
accommodations for them.2 59 The body of case law that wilderness
advocates developed to thwart exercises of agency discretion and
remove many decisions from the reach of that discretion could easily
form the basis for preserving a use within a wilderness that most
wilderness advocates would probably dislike. Similar conflicts may
involve ecological restoration programs that seek to preserve a species
protected under the Endangered Species Act or programs to stop the
spread of invasive species that harm both a wilderness area and
surrounding lands.
A real example of how the insistence of the courts on the purity of
wilderness can undermine overall ecological and wilderness protection
values lies in the cases discussing the concept of "de facto wilderness."
This idea emerges most clearly in the Wyoming district court opinion
invalidating the Clinton administration's roadless area rule.26 ° That rule
generally prohibited the construction of roads in areas of national forests
previously classified as roadless.2 61 Wilderness advocates lobbied for

259. See supra note 84, discussing wheelchairs in wilderness.
260. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Wyo. 2003), vacated
as moot, 414 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 570 F.
Supp. 2d 1309 (D. Wyo. 2008).
261. Roadless Area Conservation, 36 C.F.R. § 294 (2001). For a history of the
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this rule both for the ecological benefits of the roadless areas that would
be subject to less disturbance and to increase the chances that some of
these lands would receive congressional protection under the Wilderness
Act. When the district court invalidated the rule, it found that the rule
created "de facto wilderness" areas because it prohibited road building
and effectively limited other activities that cannot take place within
wilderness areas. 262 Relying on Section 2(a) of the Wilderness Act,
which provides that "no Federal lands shall be designated as 'wilderness
areas' except as provided for in this Act or by a subsequent Act, ' 263 the
district court concluded that the protection of roadless areas violated the
Wilderness Act because it constituted an unlawful administrative
addition of lands to the National Wilderness Preservation System.
This decision is wrong. To be sure, there is legislative history that
could be read to support the district court's decision. 264 Nevertheless, the
reasoning overall does not comport with the Wilderness Act or the
statutes governing the management of the national forests, for at least
two reasons. First, roadless areas as protected under the Clinton
administration's rule were simply not wilderness areas. Although the
roadless area rule generally prohibited road-building, it allowed such
construction in more cases than would the Wilderness Act, since the
Wilderness Act bans all permanent roads. Moreover, the roadless area
rule permitted activities that the Wilderness Act prohibits, the most
important being commercial activities, so long as no roads were
constructed. Thus, commercial logging using helicopters is perfectly
acceptable under the roadless area rule but is clearly barred under the
Wilderness Act. Second, the district court's interpretation of Section
2(c) of the Wilderness Act goes beyond the meaning and intent of that
section. Congress wanted to make sure that the land management
agencies did not attempt to retain their preexisting authority to designate
wilderness areas with the concomitant power to remove that designation.
Congress nevertheless expected that the land management agencies
roadless area controversy and its relationship to wilderness debates, see supra notes 77-79
and accompanying text.
262. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1348 (D. Wyo. 2008);
Wyoming v. U.S Dep't of Agric., 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1236 . The district court judge,
Brimmer, is not necessarily hostile to wilderness interests. Indeed, some cases decided by
this judge were coded as "pro-wilderness" in the empirical portion of this article. See High
Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2006) (Brimmer, J.,
sitting by designation); Getty Oil Co. v. Clark, 614 F. Supp. 904 (D. Wyo. 1985).
263. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (a) (Westlaw 2009).
264. The House Report states that the agencies cannot "make wholesale designations
of additional areas in which use would be limited." H.R. REP. No. 88-1538, at 1 (1964),
reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3615, 3616.
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would manage lands so as to preserve them for possible inclusion in the
National Wilderness Preservation System. Indeed, in some instances
Congress directed the agencies to act in ways that did not impair their
possible inclusion in the system.
If the concept of "de facto wilderness" gains further traction,
however, the land management agencies could find their discretion to
protect lands under their care limited. Indeed, under some
circumstances, agencies may feel tempted to resist efforts to protect such
areas, claiming that they cannot legally create de facto wilderness,
thereby reviving the purity debate that underlay the Eastern Wilderness
Areas Act. 65 Judge Brimmer's decision could be used by opponents of
wildland preservation to insist that multiple-use public lands must have
increased uses to ensure that they are not "de facto wilderness." This
outcome would thwart the overall goal of landscape and ecological
preservation.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Wilderness Act forms an important bulwark against continuing
development of lands in the United States. Even though it only applies
to federally-owned lands, it nevertheless provides extensive protection
to 109 million acres-an area larger than the entire state of California.
The Wilderness Act protects various biota, from tropical rainforest to
tundra. All of those efforts mark a signal achievement in American law:
the protection of unspoiled landscapes.
This Article has examined the reaction of courts to questions
involving wilderness management. It has shown that courts do not act as
they do in other areas of law. Although one can defend their decisions
on statutory, jurisprudential, and policy grounds, the reasoning
supporting their decisions may lead to further difficulties from the
standpoint of protecting wilderness and ecosystems.

265. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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